Debt-Deflation: Concepts, and a Stylised Model by Goetz von Peter
 
  




Debt-deflation: concepts and 
a stylised model 





Monetary and Economic Department 
April 2005 






















BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank 
for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the 





Copies of publications are available from: 
Bank for International Settlements 
Press & Communications 
CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland 
 
E-mail: publications@bis.org 
Fax: +41 61 280 9100 and +41 61 280 8100 
This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). 
 
 
©  Bank for International Settlements 2005. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced 
or translated provided the source is cited. 
 
ISSN 1020-0959 (print) 




This paper proposes a model of how agents adjust their asset holdings in response to losses
in general equilibrium. By emphasising the relation between deﬂation and ﬁnancial distress,
we capture some original features of the early debt-deﬂation literature, such as distress selling,
instability, and endogenous monetary contraction.
The agents aﬀected by a shock sell oﬀ assets to prevent their debt from crowding out consumption.
But their distress-selling causes a decline in equilibrium prices, and the resulting losses elicit
reactions by all agents. This activates several channels of debt-deﬂation. Yet we show that this
process remains stable, even in the presence of large shocks, high indebtedness, and wide-spread
default. What keeps the asset market stable is the presence of agents without prior debt or losses,
who borrow to exploit the expected asset price recovery. By contrast, debt-deﬂation becomes
unstable when agents try to contain their indebtedness, or when a credit crunch interferes with
the accommodation necessary for stability.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E51, G33, G21, G18.
Keywords: Debt-Deﬂation, Leverage, Reﬁnancing, Losses, Financial Distress, Distress Selling,
Asset Prices, Credit, Inside Money.
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The world-wide decline of inﬂation over the last decades has renewed concerns about the threat of
deﬂation, a decline in the price level. But why should we fear deﬂation? A historically informed
answer will certainly include ﬁnancial distress. DeLong reminds us that during the Great Depression
“almost every analyst placed general deﬂation, and the bankruptcies it caused, at or near the heart
of the worst macroeconomic disaster the world had ever seen” (DeLong 1999 p. 231).
In this paper we explore the concept of debt-deﬂation. We propose a stylised model to illustrate its
key features, including unexpected losses, distress selling, and distributional eﬀects. These features
reﬂect the central place that ﬁnancial distress occupies in traditional accounts of deﬂation. The
term debt-deﬂation was coined by Irving Fisher (1933), and refers to the way debt and deﬂation
destabilise each other. The issue of stability arises because the relation runs both ways: deﬂation
causes ﬁnancial distress, and ﬁnancial distress in turn exacerbates deﬂation. The former was known
for centuries, but the latter was, in our view, a key insight of the debt-deﬂation literature. This
‘feedback’ from ﬁnancial distress to deﬂation can occur through several channels:
• Fisher (1933) argued that borrowers attempting to reduce their burden of debt (‘indebtedness’)
engage in distress selling to raise money for repaying debt. But repayment in aggregate causes
a contraction in the money supply and price level deﬂation.
• Minsky (1982) elaborated the concept to incorporate the asset market. He recognised that dis-
tress selling reduces asset prices, causing losses to agents with maturing debts. This reinforces
distress selling and reduces consumption and investment spending, which deepens deﬂation.
• Bernanke (1983) observed that debt-deﬂation involves wide-spread bankruptcy, impairing the
process of credit intermediation. The resulting credit contraction depresses aggregate demand.
Note that these channels involve features that are quite uncommon in today’s mainstream macroe-
conomics: among them are losses and distress selling, the idea that debt and deﬂation destabilise
each other, and the notion that the quantity of money endogenously contracts through the re-
payment of debt. Note also that some standard methods, including the representative agent and
log-linearisation, are not well-suited for exploring this territory. This may explain the shortage of
formal work on debt-deﬂation.
One route forward is to augment a monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
heterogeneity, assets and debt, distress selling, banking and default. Christiano et al (2004) take
a step in this direction.1 A less ambitious route, pursued here, is to focus on a speciﬁc eﬀect of
importance for debt-deﬂation. Existing models focus largely on output eﬀects.2 The earlier literature
1 Christiano et al present a quantitative account of the Great Depression. Because their model consists of a
stable, linearised propagation mechanism, several large shocks are necessary to replicate the behaviour of key variables.
The model yields important insights, but it does not highlight the channels and stability considerations associated with
debt-deﬂation.
2 Several papers examine why a redistribution of wealth from borrowers to lenders is not neutral in terms of
output. In Tobin (1980) and King (1994), aggregate demand falls because lenders have a lower propensity to spend
than do borrowers. In Bernanke and Gertler (1989) output falls because borrowers’ reduced net worth aggravates the
agency problem that constrains investment. (The concept of ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ was further developed by Kiyotaki
1suggests, however, that output eﬀects occur rather as a consequence of debt-deﬂation which, at its
core, features the link between deﬂation and ﬁnancial distress. These models are neither monetary,
nor explicitly about ﬁnancial distress, leaving this link unaddressed.
We propose a model of how agents adjust their asset holdings in response to losses in general
equilibrium. Distributional eﬀects are emphasised, and output eﬀects are put aside, by adopting a
frictionless, ﬂexible-price speciﬁcation in which markets clear and output remains at capacity. In
spite of its stylised nature, the model contains assets, debt, default, and banking with inside money,
in dynamic general equilibrium. The overlapping generations structure makes it easy to deal with
these features, especially with the consequences of default.
The mechanism works as follows. Firms are active for three periods; they purchase assets when
young, and sell output (and resell assets) when old. Since their sales revenue arrives in their ﬁnal
period, they must borrow to purchase assets.3 In a perfect foresight equilibrium, ﬁrms simply hold
a constant quantity of assets across periods. We then let a redistributive shock set oﬀ the debt-
deﬂation process. Having expected more favorable conditions, the shock prompts ﬁrms to readjust
their assets and debt. Conceptually, three policies can be distinguished,
• Reﬁnancing: hold ﬁxed the quantity of assets (and borrow the necessary amount).
• User cost spending: hold ﬁxed the fraction of income spent on user cost.4
• Containing indebtedness: hold ﬁxed debt over net worth.
User cost spending is the optimal policy. Following losses, ﬁrms indeed engage in distress selling: they
sell oﬀ assets they had planned to hold, to prevent that ﬁnal period consumption gets crowded out by
the burden of debt. Distress-selling causes second-round eﬀects, as the changing equilibrium prices
cause losses and elicit reactions by all agents. This activates several channels of debt-deﬂation, but
we show that debt-deﬂation remains stable even in the presence of large shocks, high indebtedness,
and wide-spread default.5 The main reason for stability is that those ﬁrms without any prior debt or
losses are willing to increase their borrowing to exploit the expected asset price recovery.
This outcome lies half-way between the policy of reﬁnancing, which produces no debt-deﬂation, and
the policy of containing indebtedness, which produces unstable debt-deﬂation as Fisher and Minsky
predicted. The notion of unstable debt-deﬂation ultimately relies on reasons why agents try to
and Moore (1997), and Bernanke et al (1999), to include a role for asset prices in explaining output eﬀects.) A related
question is whether increased price ﬂexibility helps stabilise output, as assumed in much of economics. DeLong and
Summers (1986) argue, using a Taylor price-staggering model, that this is typically not the case.
3 We introduce debt and banking with the following device: all assets are initially owned by households, who only
want to consume goods; and all goods are produced by ﬁrms, who want to use assets. To achieve the desired pattern
of exchange, the banking system intermediates payments and credit, whereby ﬁrms become borrowers and households
become depositors.
4 User cost is the eﬀective cost of holding an asset. It is today’s asset price minus next period’s resale price
discounted.
5 The result that default is not destabilising is due, in part, to the absence of side-eﬀects that might arise if
frictions and uncertainty were added. It no longer holds when default aﬀects credit intermediation, as shown in section
5.
2contain or reduce their indebtedness. Margin requirements can be one such reason. A credit crunch,
which interferes with the accommodation necessary for stability, can be another.
Although our model of debt-deﬂation derives from writings on the Great Depression, we believe it
is of broader interest. First, the logic of the model applies as much to unexpected disinﬂation as
to deﬂation. Second, falling asset prices are shown to be as harmful as deﬂation, and the asset
market may well be more liable to instability. Another possibility is risk aversion and precautionary
behaviour, but including uncertainty is left for future research.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a structured view of the debt-deﬂation literature
to identify the main channels. Section 2 develops the perfect foresight benchmark. Section 3
introduces an exogenous shock and studies agents’ reactions to losses. Section 4 examines the
channels of debt-deﬂation, their stability, and the role of distress selling. Section 5 considers two
instances of unstable debt-deﬂation. The ﬁnal section concludes with a discussion of limitations and
relevance.
1 Debt-deﬂation - selected literature
Deﬂation had been a regular phenomenon under various specie standards. The consequences of
deﬂation were often benign, but sometimes not (Bordo and Filardo 2004). Thornton (1802) al-
ready emphasised that deﬂation in the presence of rigid wages would produce ﬁnancial distress.6
Christiernin (1761) and Attwood (1817) further understood that falling prices reduce the ability to
repay nominally ﬁxed debt (see Humphrey 2003).7 This was well before the link between deﬂation
and ﬁnancial distress was made abundantly clear by depressions before and during the 1930s.8
Thus it has been known for a long time that deﬂation may produce ﬁnancial distress. It is our view
that the main achievement of the debt-deﬂation literature, initiated by Fisher (1933), was to recognise
that ﬁnancial distress in turn worsens deﬂation. This feedback reveals a distinctly macroeconomic,
general equilibrium understanding of deﬂation.
1.1 Fisher: price level
Fisher’s (1933) article “The Debt-Deﬂation Theory of Great Depressions” sets out a monetary the-
ory of how ﬁnancial distress exacerbates deﬂation. Fisher’s argument starts with a state of ‘over-
6 Thornton (1802) cautions that “the bank [of England], in the attempt to produce this very low price [level to
encourage exports] may [..] so exceedingly distress trade and discourage manufactures as to impair [...] the restoration
of our balance of trade.” (p. 152).
7 The role of ﬁnancial distress also appeared in the literature on the trade cycle, reaching back to Adam Smith
(‘overtrading, revulsion and discredit’). See also Kindleberger (1996), chapter 2.
8 Over time this link became obvious to economic commentators and attracted little economic analysis. I thank
Robert Mundell for pointing this out. For instance, Veblen (1904) states “A decline of prices which widely touches
business interests brings depression” (p. 234-5), but then, “Secondary eﬀects, such as perturbations of the rate of
interest, insolvency, forced sales, and the like, need scarcely be taken up here, although it may be well to keep in mind
that these secondary eﬀects are commonly very considerable and far-reaching [...]” (p. 111).
3indebtedness’. Agents seek to reduce indebtedness by ‘liquidating’ debt. The ﬁrst and most important
steps in Fisher’s ‘chain of consequences’ are,
“(1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling and to (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank
loans are paid oﬀ, and to a slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits
and of their velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes (3) A fall in the level of prices, in
other words, a swelling of the dollar.”
Irving Fisher (1933) p. 342, Fisher’s emphasis.
Fisher views price level deﬂation as “the root of almost all the evils” that he elaborates in six further
steps (1932 p. 39). Note that, rather than taking deﬂation as given, he explains it as the consequence
of agents’ attempt to reduce their indebtedness.9 They do so by distress selling, to raise the money for
repaying bank loans. Repayment in aggregate reduces the quantity of money, or ‘deposit currency’,
which causes deﬂation. (This last step presumably relies on his quantity equation.) Since deﬂation
is known to increase indebtedness, Fisher’s channel closes the loop of debt-deﬂation,
“and if the over-indebtedness with which we started was great enough, the liquidation of debts
cannot keep up with the fall of prices which it causes. In that case, liquidation defeats itself.
While it diminishes the number of dollars owed, it may not do so as fast as it increases the value
of each dollar owed. Then, the very eﬀort of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases
it, because of the mass eﬀect of the stampede to liquidate in swelling each dollar owed. Then we
have the great paradox which, I submit, is the chief secret of most, if not all, great depressions:
The more the debtors pay, the more they owe. The more the economic boat tips, the more it
tends to tip. It is not tending to right itself, but is capsizing. But if the over-indebtedness is not
suﬃciently great to make liquidation thus defeat itself, the situation is diﬀerent and simpler. It
is then more analogous to a stable equilibrium; the more the boat rocks the more it will tend to
right itself.”
Irving Fisher (1933) p. 344-45, Fisher’s emphasis.
Fisher’s theory was largely ignored by contemporaries, until it was revisited by Tobin, Minsky, and
Kindleberger.10 Yet, Fisher’s theory was arguably novel in several respects. First, of course, the theory
introduced the idea that ﬁnancial distress feeds back on deﬂation. It is based on individually optimal
behaviour in the form of distress selling.11 But in contrast to the “liquidationists”, Fisher viewed
distress selling in aggregate as harmful.12 Second, in contrast to the price-specie ﬂow mechanism,
which emphasised deﬂation in the context of selling goods to stem external drain, Fisher emphasised
9 Minsky puts deﬂation even further down the causal chain, see Minsky (1982) p. 388.
10 One book review of 1933 argued the theory was not novel (King 1994). This may well be because the eﬀect of
deﬂation on the burden of debt was well understood at the time, while the reverse was not recognised as important.
11 If Fisher’s description of distress selling appears micro-founded in a rather modern way, it may have been
informed by his personal misfortune. He had bought stock on margin, and the market crash of 1929 left him bankrupt
(Schwartz 1997 p. 104).
12 Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury during the Great Depression, was associated with the doctrine ”Liq-
uidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.[...] It will purge the rottenness out of the
system”, quoted in Kindleberger (1996) p. 127.




















This last point becomes clear when recasting the problem in terms of aggregate demand. ’Classicals’
such as Pigou viewed deﬂation as stabilizing, as the greater real value of money associated with a
lower price level would stimulate aggregate demand.14 Kalecki (1944) noted that the Pigou eﬀect
would in practice be conﬁned to a small base, namely ‘outside’ money, as every other ﬁnancial
asset is a liability to some private debtor, who is correspondingly hurt by deﬂation. While Pigou
emphasised gains to creditors, Fisher emphasised losses to debtors. Should the opposite forces
not simply cancel?15 Tobin (1975, 1980) argued that Fisher’s channel dominates, because debtors
generally have a higher propensity to spend than creditors. Debtors borrow because they have a
higher propensity to spend,
“Among the stocks ﬁxed in the short run are private debts in the unit of account. These
are a heavier burden to debtors the lower the price level, and there are good reasons why
transfer of real income and wealth to creditors spells a net deﬁcit of aggregate demand.”
James Tobin (1975) p. 197
“Aggregation would not matter if we could be sure that the marginal propensities to spend from
wealth were the same for creditors and debtors. But if the spending propensity were systemat-
ically greater for debtors, even by a small amount, the Pigou eﬀect would be swamped by this
Fisher eﬀect.
James Tobin (1980) p. 10
Tobin’s variation over Fisher’s theme connects spending back to deﬂation, as shown in the ﬁgure.
Tobin (1975) also suggested that deﬂation lowers the value of the capital stock and equity, making
both consumption and investment less attractive. The role of asset prices was further explored by
Minsky.
13 Liquidation involves the selling of the borrower’s possessions, “his stocks, his bonds, his farmland, or whatever
his available assets may be” (Fisher 1932 p. 13).
14 Although Pigou (1943) merely considered steady states, it was assumed that deﬂation would play a stabilizing
role in dynamic adjustment, see Pigou (1947).
15 In the classical model, the Pigou eﬀect on outside money, relabelled ‘real balance eﬀect’ by Patinkin, has a zero
net eﬀect when all money is ‘inside’ and banks are perfectly competitive (Patinkin 1948, 1971).
51.2 Minsky: asset prices
Minsky’s (1982) elaboration of debt-deﬂation incorporates the asset market. He recognised that
distress selling reduces asset prices, which (1) reinforces distress selling, and (2) worsens deﬂation.
Regarding the ﬁrst channel, Minsky (1982) wrote,
“Fisher does not identify the ways a unit can get cash to repay loans that fall due. [...] Once
a situation exists where debt payments cannot be made either by cash from operations or reﬁ-
nancing, so that assets have to be sold, then the requirements imposed by the debt structure can
lead to a fall in the prices of assets. In a free market, the fall in asset prices can be so large that
the sale of assets cannot realize the funds needed to fulﬁll commitments.”
Hyman Minsky (1982) p. 383-84
In other words, when distress selling reduces asset prices, the resulting losses exacerbate indebtedness,
and may lead to further distress selling. As in Fisher, distress selling can be self-defeating. The asset
market and distress selling feed back on each other (Minsky1 in the ﬁgure). Kindleberger (1996), in
his famous “Manias, Panics, and Crashes”, takes Minsky’s approach as the organising principle for





















Regarding the second channel, Minsky argues that the fall in asset prices reinforces deﬂation,
“If payment commitments cannot be met from the normal sources, then a unit is forced either
to borrow or to sell assets. Both borrowing on unfavorable terms and the forced sale of assets
usually result in a capital loss for the aﬀected unit. However, for any unit, capital losses and
gains are not symmetrical: there is a ceiling to the capital losses a unit can take and still fulﬁll
its commitments. Any loss beyond this limit is passed on to its creditors by way of default
or reﬁnancing of the contracts. Such induced capital losses result in a further contraction of
consumption and investment beyond that due to the initiating decline in income. This can result
in a recursive debt-deﬂation process.”
Hyman Minsky (1963) p. 6-7
In other words, losses from the decline of asset values reduce aggregate spending through a wealth
eﬀect (labelled Minsky2).
61.3 Bernanke: credit
Both Fisher and Minsky emphasised the consequence of ﬁnancial distress for macroeconomic vari-
ables: aggregate spending, the price level, and asset prices. Another channel of feedback can arise
when ﬁnancial distress aﬀects the banking system.
Keynes (1931) argued that the modern world is characterised by ﬁnancial intermediation, as the
banking system advances money on goods, shares, bonds, and real estate. Already by 1931 the
practice of ﬁnancing assets on bank credit was said to have “grown to formidable dimensions”
(p. 169). The “margins of safety” (collateral and net worth) built into lending arrangements ordinarily
protect the banking system from the consequence falling prices. But suﬃciently large price declines
aﬀect the banking system: “a decline in money values so severe as that which we are now experiencing
threatens the solidity of the whole ﬁnancial structure.” (p. 176).
Keynes only mentioned in passing that new lending would thereby be curtailed (p. 172-73). It
was Bernanke (1983) who highlighted the macroeconomic signiﬁcance of a credit contraction for
aggregate spending. In the context of the Great Depression, he emphasized that wide-spread borrower
default and bank runs together reduced the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial intermediation, by raising the
cost of information-gathering and market-making services,
“The banking problems of 1930-33 disrupted the credit allocation process by creating large,
unplanned changes in the channels of credit ﬂow. [...] plus the actual failures, forced a contraction
of the banking system’s role in the intermediation of credit.” p. 264
“[...] experience does not seem to be inconsistent with the point that even good borrowers may
ﬁnd it more diﬃcult or costly to obtain credit when there is extensive insolvency. The debt crisis
should be added to the banking crisis as a potential source of disruption of the credit system.”
p. 267
“The eﬀects of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand helped convert the severe but not
unprecedented downturn of 1929-30 into a protracted depression.”
Ben Bernanke (1983) p. 257
In other words, ﬁnancial distress impairs the process of credit intermediation, and a credit contraction















This ﬁgure represents Bernanke’s channel as a feedback from credit to aggregate spending, subject
to two qualiﬁcations. First, absent asymmetric information, this channel becomes active only in the
16 Bernanke provides evidence of the pervasiveness of debtor insolvency, and argues that this contributed to an
increase in the cost of credit intermediation by complicating banks’ task of distinguishing good borrowers.
7presence of wide-spread default. Second, one should expect a credit contraction to depress asset
prices as well, based on Keynes’s observations.
Figure 1 puts the channels together. The feedback we emphasised, from ﬁnancial distress to deﬂation,
is represented by the arrows pointing upward.



































1.4 Stability and propagation
Each channel of debt-deﬂation in ﬁgure 1 closes the loop between ﬁnancial distress and deﬂation.
This naturally gives rise to the questions: what initiates debt-deﬂation? Under what conditions
does the process become unstable? Fisher’s second quotation contains an explicit stability condition:
if the initial over-indebtedness exceeds a threshold, the process becomes unstable. Debt-deﬂation
would only come to a halt in “almost universal bankruptcy” (p. 346). That the debt structure
determines stability is also reﬂected in Minsky’s quotations and in his ﬁnancial instability hypothesis
more generally.17 A robust debt structure makes the economy “an equilibrium seeking and containing
system”; but under a fragile debt structure, it becomes “a deviation amplifying system” (Minsky 1992
p. 7).18
17 The hypothesis is articulated in a series of papers, especially Minsky (1977, 1978, 1992).
18 Minsky describes robust and fragile debt structures in the following terms:
Hedge Finance: the pattern of cash ﬂow suﬃces to meet cash commitments every period.
8Thus both Fisher and Minsky view the debt-deﬂation process as potentially unstable. Tobin only
talks about stability to the extent that deﬂation weakens the adjustment mechanism following a
large shock. First, as discussed above, deﬂation-induced redistribution can reduce aggregate demand
because creditors have a lower propensity to spend. Second, higher real rates discourage consumption
and investment.19 Tobin is less concerned with unstable debt-deﬂation than with the weakening of
the adjustment mechanism that returns the economy to full capacity.
Finally, Bernanke does not specify any stability conditions. He cautions that his theory does not oﬀer
a complete explanation of the Great Depression; it neither explains its beginning, nor excludes other
theories (Bernanke 1983 p. 258). His aim is to explain the depth and length of the Depression, not
what initiated it. This is consistent with his econometric approach, and with the ﬁnancial accelerator
models developed with Gertler which, as their name suggest, amplify and propagate shocks originating
elsewhere.
Both Bernanke and Tobin therefore view debt-deﬂation primarily as a propagation mechanism. For
the process to work, deﬂation, or another form of redistribution, must already be under way. By
contrast, Fisher and Minsky view debt-deﬂation as a process capable of assuming a life of its own.
All it takes is that agents engage in distress selling because they feel over-indebted.20 Conversely,
when agents reﬁnance rather than sell assets, debt-deﬂation does not develop.
“A reversion from a speculative debt structure is triggered when interest rates rise so that the
payments on new debt as well as on reﬁnanced old debt rise relative to expected cash ﬂows. This
will aﬀect the willingness and ability of units to go into debt; units will try to substitute selling
out positions for reﬁnancing of positions.”
Hyman Minsky (1982) p. 386, emphasis added.
Note that Minsky considers debt-deﬂation a fully endogenous phenomenon, not merely a mechanism
that propagates external shocks. More generally, his ﬁnancial instability hypothesis is a theory of how
a capitalist economy endogenously generates a ﬁnancial structure susceptible to ﬁnancial crises, and
how the normal functioning of ﬁnancial markets gives rise to ﬁnancial crises (Minsky 1977 p. 67-8).
The two aspects most relevant to our discussion are, ﬁrst, that over-indebtedness occurs because
the system has an endogenous tendency towards a fragile debt structure,
“As the period over which the economy does well lengthens, two things become evident in board
rooms. Existing debts are easily validated and units that were heavily in debt prospered; it paid
to lever. [...] the margins of safety built into the debt structures were too great. [...] views about
Speculative Finance: the present value of cash ﬂows exceeds cash commitments, but reﬁnancing is needed.
Ponzi Finance: even interest payments can only be met by new issues of debt.
19 Tobin (1975) sets up a small Keynesian model whose steady state is locally stable. However, he argues that
stability could be lost when a large shock moves the economy far away from the steady state, because falling prices
discourage consumption and investment more when high real rates depress the present value of capital assets (p. 201).
20 Fisher (1933) mentions as causes of high indebtedness “new opportunities to invest at a big prospective proﬁt”,
facilitated by “easy money” (p. 348), but he does not specify when and why agents perceive their indebtedness to be
excessive. This realization, he writes, may have many causes but “the chief cause may well be that earnings, current
or expected, have begun to disappoint” (Fisher 1932 p. 40).
9acceptable debt structure change.”
Hyman Minsky (1977) p. 65
The ﬁnancial instability hypothesis does not rely on exogenous shocks to generate business cycles
(Minsky 1992 p. 9). The ‘shock’ he considers is a rise in interest rates, as evident from Minsky’s
second last quotation.21 But the rise is not a policy decision but an endogenous, private response as
it becomes apparent that the payment commitments implied by the debt structure approach expected
cash ﬂows,
“the larger the dependence upon speculative and Ponzi ﬁnance, the greater the likelihood that a
sharp run up in short-term interest rates will occur.”
Hyman Minsky (1982) p. 387
In other words, the “shock” is not exogenous, but a result of the endogenous evolution toward a
more fragile debt structure.
1.5 Original features
In reviewing these contributions, it becomes clear that some original features of the debt-deﬂation
literature have no counterpart in today’s mainstream macroeconomics. First, the notion that the
quantity of money endogenously contracts through repayment is no longer encountered, neither in
macroeconomics nor in banking theory.22 The post-War literature discusses monetary contraction
mostly in the context of bank runs with no reference to borrower distress.23 Clearly, Fisher’s repay-
ment channel is also operative when banks are not run upon.
Second, the role of ﬁnancial distress remains relatively unexplored by modern macroeconomics. Com-
pared to the earlier literature, ﬁnancial distress became less prominent in interwar economics (see
Haberler 1960, Laidler 1999), and less prominent still in post-War macroeconomics. Although recent
decades witnessed renewed interest in credit issues, this development has not yet reached a stage on
which the ideas of the debt-deﬂation literature would naturally take hold.24 More generally, a number
of standard methods today are not well suited for exploring debt-deﬂation, for instance the use of
representative agent models, and log-linearisation around the steady state. Linearisation distracts
from the global stability analysis relevant in the context of debt-deﬂation.
We now develop a stylised model that attempts to capture some of the key features of debt-deﬂation.
21 He considers as equivalent a fall in asset values, Minsky (1963) p. 91.
22 Important exceptions include Black (1970) in ﬁnance, and McAndrews and Roberds (1995) in banking theory,
and much of the Post-Keynesian literature, e.g Moore (1988).
23 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that bank runs were harmful (only) because they produced a decline
in money supply. This becomes clear from their suggestion that the Depression would have been worse had the
decline in the money stock been produced some other way, without bank failures, because these also reduced money
demand (p. 353). To the extent it is discussed, monetarists put ﬁnancial distress among non-bank borrowers causally
last. Schwartz (1995) argues that ﬁnancial distress is the result of price level ﬂuctuations (not the reverse), because
unexpected deﬂation distorts loan terms and leads to defaults. Bordo and Wheelock (1998) provide empirical support.
24 For instance, few models allow for wide-spread default and losses to the banking system. This includes Bernanke
et al (1999), and Christiano et al (2004). This issue is taken up in von Peter (2004).
102 The basic model
We build on the model of von Peter (2004) which has several useful features. Firms and households
are present; households hold deposits, whereas ﬁrms are indebted and hold assets. As in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), the absence of a rental market generates indebtedness. But instead of productive
assets, we use utility-yielding assets, as in the housing literature (e.g. Miles 1995).25 Credit is
intermediated by banks, which makes it possible for money to contract through the repayment of
debt. The overlapping generations structure implies active markets and makes dealing with losses
and default tractable. The main departure from von Peter (2004) is to incorporate distress selling.
The method is to start with a perfect foresight model, and to perturb its steady state with a shock
to examine whether a debt-deﬂation process arises. Note, ﬁnally, that the analysis is conducted in
nominal terms: relative prices, such as the real asset price, do not convey all the information relevant
for the repayment of nominal debt.
2.1 Firms
Firms of each generation are three period-lived (young, mid-age, old) and produce consumption
goods. Production takes one period, and so does bringing goods to the market. The typical ﬁrm
entering in t − 1 hires labour, and sells its production at price level pt+1. Out of sales revenue
pt+1y( ), the ﬁrm pays the wage wt+1, determined on a competitive labour market at the time of
hiring t − 1.26 The ﬁrm chooses labour to maximise proﬁts,
max
nt−1
Πt+1 = pt+1y(nt−1) − nt−1wt+1.
The production function is standard neoclassical. Labour demand is given by equating the marginal
product to the real wage,
y0(nd
t−1) = wt+1/pt+1. (1)
The next question is how proﬁts are disposed. We assume that each ﬁrm is owned by an entrepreneur
who enjoys ﬁnal period consumption. Entrepreneurs also derive utility from holding real assets, which
can be thought of as housing. Assets provide a service ﬂow proportional to the quantity held from
one period to the next. Hence, asset holdings, h, appear directly in entrepreneur’s utility function,
V = (1 − θ)lnct+1 + θ

lnht−1 + β lnh0
t

/(1 + β), (2)
where β is the discount factor, and θ ∈ [0,1] measures the preference for assets.27 An entrepreneur
who only values ﬁnal period consumption (θ = 0) will spend proﬁts entirely on goods. With pref-
erences over both consumption and housing, entrepreneurs will choose {ht−1,h0
t,ct+1} all positive,
25 This assumption is made for simplicity. Results remain qualitatively unchanged if assets enter the production
function instead, as in von Peter (2004).
26 This assumptions makes the wage bill similar to nominal debt. By time t workers have already delivered their
labour input, and the ﬁrm can no longer modify the nominal wage in response to an unanticipated change in pt+1.
27 The prime on h
0
t denotes next-period demand for assets. We use ht to refer to the ﬁrst-period demand of the
next generation of ﬁrms, entering at t.
11buying ht−1 when young, adjusting this position to h0











As production takes time, sales revenue accrues late, and asset holding is accompanied by borrowing
B at the gross nominal interest rate R = β−1,
qt−1ht−1 = Bt−1
qt(h0
t − ht−1) + RBt−1 = B0
t (3)
pt+1ct+1 + RB0
t = Πt+1 + qt+1h0
t.
Combining these period constraints yields the intertemporal budget constraint. It states that spending
on consumption and assets (braced) adds up to proﬁts,
pt+1ct+1 + R2ut−1ht−1 + Ruth0
t | {z }
= Πt+1. (4)
The term ut ≡ qt − qt+1/R is the user cost, the purchasing price minus the resale price discounted
by the cost of borrowing. User cost is the cost of holding an asset between periods t and t + 1,
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Note that user cost is a small fraction of the asset price qt
because assets, unlike goods, can be resold after use. (This will provide a strong incentive to become
indebted.)
Given Πt+1, the ﬁrm’s problem is to maximise (2) subject to (4). The ﬁrst order conditions equate











where ξ = 1/Πt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier on (4). Thus it is optimal to spend the ﬁxed share
(1 − θ) of proﬁts on consumption, and to split the remainder θ equally between user costs,
consumption spending pt+1ct+1 = (1 − θ)Πt+1 (5)
user cost spending Ruth0
t = Rut−1ht−1 = θΠt+1/(1 + R). (6)
Remarks. Firms are necessarily indebted while active (Bt−1,B0
t > 0), because they purchase assets
upfront, before earning sales revenue. (3) also shows that debt service tends to reduce consumption
spending. Note that ﬁrms can reduce their debt in t only by selling assets, i.e. B0
t < RBt−1
⇔ h0
t < ht−1. This will form the basis for distress selling. Yet, do these observations imply that
entrepreneurs actually care about debt per se? No. Entrepreneurs optimally choose the amount of
spending on user cost in (6), regardless of the implied path for debt. Put diﬀerently, the notion of user
cost is inherently dynamic - it embodies the fact that reselling assets at a higher price makes it easier
12to repay debt in the future: asset price appreciation eﬀectively reduces the cost of servicing debt.28
This suggests that the analysis of distress selling requires a context where asset price dynamics are
set against debt considerations.
2.2 Households






Households work every period, providing one unit of labour, and they save in the form of interest-
bearing deposits. The ﬂow constraint states that consumption spending (st ≡ ptch
t ) plus deposits
are ﬁnanced by the wage plus accumulated deposits,
st + Dt = wt + RDt−1. (8)
Households solve a standard intertemporal consumption problem, maximising (7) subject to (8). The
slope of optimal consumption is given by the familiar Euler equation,
u0(ch





In steady state, it must be the case that R = β−1, the interest rate equals the inverse rate of
time-preference, as assumed above.30 Consumption spending then equals permanent income, s =
w+(R−1)D. To specify how spending deviates outside steady state, we posit time-separable CRRA
utility u(c) = c1−γ−1









This expression depends on 1/γ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Note that a low
price level today attracts increased spending, provided IES is high (with γ < 1, pt < pt+1 implies
st > st+1). We will focus on γ < 1, so that a higher real interest rate encourages saving, discourages
spending. The values of st and st+1 will be determined by goods market clearing. Hence lower γ
means more responsive household spending, which translates into smaller price level variation. The
case γ → 0 admits a well-deﬁned ﬁxed-price limit.
Initial wealth and deposits are determined by what happens at ‘the beginning of the world’. To
bring into existence a large volume of credit, we resort to the device introduced in von Peter (2004).
28 For given Πt+1, entrepreneurs will take on more debt when the user cost falls, ut < ut−1 ⇒ h
0
t > ht−1. At
the extreme, a user cost of zero would mean that assets appreciate at the rate of interest, qt+1 = Rqt. In that case,
demand for assets, and consequently the willingness to incur debt, would become unbounded.
29 It is at date 2 that goods ﬁrst become available, produced by ﬁrms of generation 0.
30 For simplicity, we assume that the nominal rate remains pegged outside the steady state. As interest rate
rules are not the subject of this paper, we assume a ﬁxed rate and dispense with nominal price level indeterminacy by
imposing p2 = 1. Real interest rate movements are then solely due to price level movements.
13Households are initially endowed with all the assets; they receive h assets at dates t = 0,1. As
households derive utility only from consumption, they will sell h to the ﬁrst generations of ﬁrms.31
Hence initial household wealth equals D1 = (q1 + q0R)h, the counterpart of the borrowing of the
ﬁrst two generations of ﬁrms.
2.3 The banking system
We introduce a banking system because the views of Fisher, Keynes, Bernanke and Minsky involve a
close relation between deposit money, bank credit and asset prices. Households are the lenders in this
economy, while ﬁrms are borrowers each period since production takes time. Eﬃcient intertemporal
exchange requires that assets be passed down successive generations of ﬁrms, in exchange for part
of ﬁrms’ output consumed by households.
Figure 2: Structure of the Economy
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In this context we motivate banking as a payment and credit mechanism (as elaborated in von
Peter 2004). Deposits serve as the means of payment. They are created through lending, and are
held across periods by households. Every period t, the banking system creates deposits worth qtht
by extending loans to new ﬁrms. New ﬁrms then purchase assets by transferring their new deposits
to old ﬁrms.32 This allows old ﬁrms to repay what they had borrowed when young, spending the
remainder on goods consistent with (3). Households spend st of their accumulated deposits on ﬁrm
output, and keep the remainder on deposit consistent with (8).
We consider the banking system as a single competitive entity with no capital and no proﬁts.33
Thus bank assets consist of credit extended to ﬁrms, matched by monetary liabilities in the form of
household deposits,
31 Households save by holding deposits rather than real assets. This is because deposits are interest-bearing, while
assets cannot appreciate at the rate of interest in addition to yielding utility to entrepreneurs. (User cost must remain
positive and equal to entrepreneurs’ marginal utility.)
32 At dates t = 0,1 these payments go to households selling their asset endowment.
33 The banking system provides elastic credit at R, consistent with ﬁrms’ intertemporal budget constraint; there
are no separate credit constraints.
14Bank Balance Sheet in t
Bt Dt
B0
t (K = 0)
The bank balance sheet is recorded after the close of markets. Hence the two generations of ﬁrms
concurrently borrowing are the young, who just started borrowing, and the mid-age, who carry over
their borrowing plus interest from last period. (Old ﬁrms were removed from the balance sheet upon




t − ht−1) + Rqt−1ht−1

= Dt. (10)
2.4 Perfect foresight equilibrium
A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of prices {pt,qt,wt}, and quantities {ct,ch
t ,ht,h0
t,nt}
such that ﬁrms maximise (2) subject to (4); households maximise (7) subject to (8) and initial
wealth; and the goods, asset and labour markets clear every period. The overlapping generations
structure, depicted in ﬁgure 2, gives rise to active markets, open at the beginning of every period.
Labour market equilibrium requires nd
t = 1, because a unit measure of ﬁrms hire, and an equal mea-
sure of workers supply one unit each. From (1) the constant equilibrium real wage is wt/pt = y0(1),
or
wt = εpty, and
Πt = (1 − ε)pty (11)
where y ≡ y (1) is output, and ε ≡ y0(n)n
y|n=1 is output elasticity. Consistent with the neoclas-
sical distribution of income, labour earns the competitive wage (the marginal value product), and
entrepreneurs earn the remainder.34
Goods market clearing requires that produced output y equals the consumption demands of house-
holds and old ﬁrms, y = ch
t + ct (the two larger circles in ﬁgure 2). Using (5) and (11), the goods
market clears when
pty = st + (1 − θ)Πt ⇒ st = εpty (12)
where ε ≡ ε + (1 − ε)θ. Pairs of {pt,st} are then determined by combining successive clearing
conditions with the Euler equation (9).
Asset market equilibrium requires that ﬁxed supply equals the asset demands of young and mid-age
ﬁrms, 2h = ht + h0




[pt+1 + pt+2]. (13)
34 Firm proﬁts can be interpreted as an implicit wage to the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor input, subsumed in
the production function.
15Aggregate user cost spending equals the spending of young and mid-age ﬁrms, which is a fraction
θ/[R(1 + R)] of proﬁts, which are in turn a fraction (1 − ε) of sales revenue, hence price levels.
Denote the coeﬃcient following the square brackets by uh. The user cost ut ≡ qt − qt+1/R being















after iterating forward and ruling out bubbles. The asset price is the present discounted value of
marginal utilities that agents derive from their use, as measured by the shares of income they dedicate
to user cost. The expression is proportional to future price levels, since greater sales revenue in the
future means agents can aﬀord to spend more on assets today.
Finally, the evolution of debts and deposits is given by (3) and (8). Using equilibrium relations allows
to restate the size of the banking system (10) as
2qth + Ruhpt+1 = Dt, (15)
which reﬂects primarily the value of the asset market, 2qth, since bank lending ﬁnances the purchase
of assets. The following provides the benchmark for subsequent results.
Proposition 1 Basic model
(a) The unique perfect foresight equilibrium is the steady state.
(b) Firms hold a constant quantity of assets throughout their lives.
(c) Firms are indebted.
Using the Euler equation (9) to connect successive goods market clearing conditions (12) implies
pt+1 = pt, hence the price level must be a constant. A constant price level p implies constant
wages and proﬁts in (11), w = εpy and Π = (1 − ε)py. Hence spending on goods and assets,
s = w + (R − 1)D, (5) and (6), must also remain constant. Therefore, from (14) and (15),
Market value of assets 2qh ≡ 2uhR/(R − 1) =
2θ(1−ε)
R2−1 py




A constant asset price leads to a constant user cost of u = q(R − 1)/R in (6). Consequently, ﬁrms
hold a constant quantity of assets, h0 = h, throughout their lives. The evolution of debt, from (3),
is therefore B = qh, and B0 = Rqh. Indebtedness is deﬁned as debt over proﬁts (in present value),




16Greater preference for assets θ implies greater indebtedness, and L > 1 when θ > (R2 − 1)/R2.
Thus for almost the full parameter range of θ ∈ [0,1], ﬁrms choose to be indebted in the sense that
debt exceeds proﬁts associated with the ﬁrm’s underlying productive activity.
Remarks. The incentive to get indebted is now easy to understand. User cost is a small fraction
of the asset price q, because assets, unlike goods, are resold after use. Ex post, therefore, the cost
of holding an asset is only small fraction of its price, namely Ru ≡ (R − 1)q, eﬀectively the net
interest rate.35 But to take advantage of this arrangement, young ﬁrms must borrow qh upfront to
purchase the assets, and carry this volume of debt until they resell assets and repay debt when old.
In the interim, they are vulnerable to unexpected asset price declines, the more so the greater their
indebtedness.
3 How do agents react to losses?
Agents are never ‘over-indebted’ in our context of optimal choices under perfect foresight. But the
idea that agents engage in distress selling to reduce their indebtedness is central to debt-deﬂation.
We now leave the perfect foresight benchmark by introducing an exogenous shock and studying
agents’ reactions to the resulting losses (this section). The changes in spending are then aggregated
across agents. Once the equilibrium system is in place, we can turn to the question of which channels
of debt-deﬂation are active, and under what conditions they become destabilising (next sections).
3.1 Shock and losses
Following Fisher (1933), the shock should trigger over-indebtedness. Following King (1994), “The key
is to examine debt-deﬂation in a model of purely distributional shocks with no aggregate uncertainty
at all.” (p. 420). A one-oﬀ redistribution from borrowers to lenders satisﬁes both criteria. We
consider a small unexpected payment ρ, due in t from all mid-age ﬁrms to households.36,37 We
assume that the failure to pay ρ would preclude ﬁrms from selling output in t+1. Mid-age ﬁrms are
the most interesting agents to expose: they are already indebted, yet can still alter their spending
on both consumption and assets. Debt and assets carried over from t − 1 are predetermined, hence
the period constraints (3) become
qh = B
qt(h0
t − h) + RB + ρ = B0
t (18)
pt+1ct+1 + RB0
t + w = pt+1y + qt+1h0
t.
35 For example u ' 0.05q when the borrowing cost is 5% - dedicating only a ﬁfth of proﬁts to user cost in (6)
ﬁnances assets worth four times proﬁts.
36 The reason for the shock is unimportant - examples include additional labour costs, increased corporate pension
contributions, or a class action lawsuit.
37 Similar experiments have been considered in non-monetary or partial-equilibrium models. Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) consider a similar redistribution to show that it aﬀects investment. Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1998)
study ﬁrms subject to a liquidity shock, but no counterparty receives any payments. Considering only one side of a
payment would be inconsistent in our model (it violates two identities).
17This shock has direct implications for liquidity and solvency. It aﬀects solvency because the loss of ρ
cannot be recovered, and spending must be modiﬁed accordingly. The shock also generates liquidity
needs, because ﬁrms have no revenue in t to pay with: they must either increase their borrowing
by ρ, or sell assets worth ρ, to be able to eﬀect the payment.
The shock merely serves the purpose of setting oﬀ the dynamics. It is assumed to be small, as we
are not interested in shocks so large as to singlehandedly bankrupt ﬁrms. We instead focus on the
system of equilibrium reactions that follow the initial shock. Intuitively, those directly aﬀected by
the shock alter their consumption and asset holdings (the direct eﬀect). But their reactions change
equilibrium prices, which produces a new round of reactions by all agents and further changes to
equilibrium prices (the general equilibrium eﬀect). The new equilibrium is found where all agents’ re-
actions are consistent with each other. Thus, the shock has potentially important general equilibrium
implications.
We now explore the reactions to the shock and its consequences simultaneously. (Appendix A1
derives the expressions that follow in detail.) Debt is predetermined, but the ability to repay is not.
In t−1 ﬁrms had borrowed qh, assuming that in t+1 they would sell goods and assets at continued
steady state prices {1,q}. Following the shock, a new set of equilibrium prices materialises. A decline
in the asset price, qt < q, reduces the value of asset holdings by qhδt, where δt ≡ (q − qt)/q denotes
the percentage decline. Likewise, any possible decline in the price level, pt+1 < 1, involves a loss of
sales revenue on goods sold next period, as shown in (18). Thus, mid-age ﬁrms face an unexpected
total loss of
Ω0 ≡ ρ + qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R. (19)
Similarly, old ﬁrms must now sell goods pt and assets at qt. They also face a decline in the value of
asset holdings and the loss of sales revenue to deﬂation. Old ﬁrms’ loss equals
Ω ≡ qhδt + (1 − pt)y. (20)
Losses imply default only when they exceed planned consumption. Once losses exceed this threshold,
limited liability implies that any further losses are transferred as non-performing loans to the banking
system (see appendix A1).
How do agents react to the losses they face? At the time of the shock, ﬁrms are at diﬀerent points
in their life-cycle (see ﬁgure 2):
• Young ﬁrms (entering in t) can take new prices into account before taking on debt. They face
no losses and behave as in the perfect foresight case (section 2.1).
• Old ﬁrms (exiting in t) only have ﬁnal consumption left to do. Their asset holdings are
predetermined, hence the loss Ω reduces only spending on consumption.
• Mid-age ﬁrms already incurred debt, yet they can still alter both their asset position and ﬁnal
consumption. Hence the loss Ω0 aﬀects spending on both consumption and assets.
In view of our discussion of debt-deﬂation, we can learn most from the behaviour of mid-age ﬁrms.
In particular, when they incurred debt in t − 1 they had intended to hold h assets until t + 1, as
18shown in proposition 1. How will they modify their asset holdings?
Deﬁnition: Reﬁnancing occurs if asset positions are held constant as intended, h0
t = h.
Distress selling occurs if assets that were intended to be held are sold oﬀ, h0
t < h.
The value realised by distress selling equals qt(h − h0
t).
3.2 Firms
We now consider three types of reactions and their implications for spending on consumption and
assets.
(1) Optimal user cost spending
A positive loss Ω0 means that mid-age ﬁrms can no longer spend as intended in steady state, namely
pc on goods and uh on assets. Firms reoptimise their choices {h0
t,ct+1} subject to their reduced
budget (appendix A1). It is optimal to revise spending downward in ﬁxed proportions of the loss,38
uth0
t = uhθ0Ω0 (21)




This is the optimal policy of user cost spending, as in (6). Now, whether this reaction involves
distress selling can only be determined once equilibrium prices have been solved for. If user cost
were to fall suﬃciently, asset holding, debt and indebtedness might all increase.39 What can be
said, however, is that debt and indebtedness per se play no role in the optimal reaction to losses,
consistent with our earlier remarks (page 12).
(2) Reﬁnancing
An alternative reaction would be for mid-age ﬁrms to hold on to all their assets until t + 1. (This
could be the result of ﬁxed adjustment costs, see appendix A2.) Reﬁnancing involves a rise in debt
to B0
t = RB + ρ, so the ﬁrm can eﬀect the payment ρ without selling assets (h0
t = h). Ex post,
spending on assets simply equals uth in (18). Consequently, consumption spending will have to be
reduced by the entire loss,
pt+1ct+1 = pc − RΩ0 + (Rδt − δt+1)qh. (23)
The last term corrects for the fact that the decline asset values is realised not in t, but in t + 1.
Note that the unit coeﬃcient on Ω0 exceeds that in (22), which had shared the loss between reduced
38 This expression holds provided the ﬁrm does not default. In case of default, h
0
t = ct+1 = 0, given ut > 0.




t > h, and (18) would imply B
0
t > RB + ρ, with a commensurate increase in
indebtedness. To illustrate this point, suppose the asset price were to appreciate as much as qt+1 > Rqt, so user cost
ut would turn negative. Then buying up all assets on credit would be proﬁtable strategy, even for a ﬁrm in default.
19spending on consumption and assets. While reﬁnancing allows agents to retain assets, the additional
debt service can be a burden on consumption.
(3) Containing indebtedness
A third possible reaction is the attempt to reduce or keep constant indebtedness, as suggested by
Fisher (1933). (This could be the result of margin requirements or uncertainty, as discussed later.)
Recall that indebtedness is measured as debt over proﬁts in (17). Thus, a positive loss Ω0 makes
ﬁrms over-indebted, unless they reduce nominal debt accordingly. Yet ﬁrms can raise money for
repaying debt only by selling assets in (18), irrespective of prices. Containing indebtedness requires
distress selling worth a multiple of the loss,
qt(h − h0
t) = ρ + LΩ0. (24)
This value far exceeds the ﬁrm’s immediate liquidity needs: ρ must be raised only to keep nominal
debt constant - to keep indebtedness constant, another LΩ0 must be realised by distress selling.
(Note, however, that ﬁrms cannot sell more than their holdings: the value of (24) cannot exceed
qth, as h0
t ≥ 0.) The implication for consumption spending is found to be








The term in square brackets equals h0
t, the remaining stock of assets after distress-selling. Hence the
impact of the loss on consumption spending, compared to (23), is moderated by the money saved
on carrying fewer assets.40
The three types of reactions we have discussed are summarised in
Proposition 2 Reactions to losses
(a) The optimal reaction is a downward revision of both consumption and user cost spending, in
proportion to the loss.
(b) Reﬁnancing would instead require a downward revision of consumption spending by the full loss.
(c) Containing indebtedness would require distress selling of assets worth a multiple of the loss.
In each case, there will be diﬀerent prices, quantities, and losses in general equilibrium. They are
determined by aggregating reactions in general equilibrium. Before doing so, we complete this section
by describing the behaviour of the remaining agents.
3.3 Households and the banking system
Households and the banking system do not alter their behaviour. The banking system faces non-
performing loans λ+ if ﬁrms default. The value of λ+ simply equals ﬁrms’ losses (19)-(20), minus
40 Appendix A3 shows how to obtain (24) and (25).
20their ability to withstand them (see appendix A1). As there are no bank dividends in this model, these
losses do not directly aﬀect aggregate spending; recognising loan losses instead involves reducing the
value of deposits, as bank capital is zero. Due to the absence of frictions and capital constraints in
our model, the banking system continues to provide elastic credit.41
Households are aﬀected in three ways relative to steady state. They are the recipients of the pay-
ment ρ by ﬁrms. However, their deposits are reduced to RD −λ+ should any ﬁrms default. Finally,
future wages fall to wt+i < w if future price levels pt+i < 1. Their intertemporal budget constraint









Importantly, wealth eﬀects leave the slope of the Euler equation (9) unchanged.
4 Stable debt-deﬂation
The previous section has determined the changes in spending on consumption and assets in response
to arbitrary price deviations. Aggregating these changes across agents will determine the equilibrium
deviations as those prices and quantities that make all agents’ reactions consistent with each other.42
For optimal user cost spending, this section shows that several channels of debt-deﬂation are active,
but none is destabilising, even when large shocks, high indebtedness, and wide-spread default are
considered.
4.1 Equilibrium system
We now develop the following result. In our context of our perfect foresight model with elastic credit,
optimal user cost spending leads to
Proposition 3 Stable debt-deﬂation
(a) Uniqueness:
• for a zero shock ρ, the continued steady state is the unique equilibrium, provided γ < 1.
• Prices are decreasing in the shock, p0
t (ρ), p0
t+1 (ρ), and q0
t (ρ) < 0, until defaults occur.
Hence debt-deﬂation is not fully endogenous: an exogenous shock must initiate it.
(b) Stability:
• the system is deviation-amplifying in the channels of Fisher, Minsky, and Tobin, but
• debt-deﬂation remains globally stable, for any indebtedness and any size of shock.
• Default per se is not destabilising.
Hence the channels of Fisher, Tobin and Minsky are not destabilising in this model.
41 This is modiﬁed in section 5.2. More generally, dividends, bank capital, and credit crunches are considered in
von Peter (2004).
42 This method is not speciﬁc to the nature, or presence, of the original shock.
21Appendix B1 derives the general system, comprising the four possibilities that no-one, old ﬁrms,
mid-aged ﬁrms, or both types default. Appendix B2 then shows that by t + 2, the system reverts
to the previous steady state: the dynamics cease when all ﬁrms aﬀected by the shock have left the
model. Uniqueness is then established for ρ = 0.
This allows us to start our discussion from the equilibrium system without default, (27). It consists of
goods markets, the asset market, and Euler equations. Note that the supply side remains unchanged:
2h assets turn over every period, and ouput remains at capacity y since the competitive wage
clears the labour market. (Appendix B4 considers nominal wage rigidity, unemployment, and output
eﬀects.) Goods market equilibrium (GM) relates deﬂation to the fall in aggregate spending by
households and ﬁrms, relative to steady state where p = 1. The asset market (AM) relates the asset
price decline δt to reduced user cost spending,
GMt : (1 − pt)y = (s − st) + [qhδt + (1 − pt)y]
GMt+1 : (1 − pt+1)y = (s − st+1) + (1 − θ0)

ρ + qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R

R
AMt : δt = θ0
2qh







γ−1 ∀i ≥ 0,
(27)
and pt+i = p0 = 1 for i ≥ 2, δt+i = (1 − p0) = 0 for i ≥ 1, and wt+i = w for i ≥ 0. Note that the
Euler equation admits a well-deﬁned ﬁxed-price limit, pt+i = 1 when γ = 0, for the reasons discussed
in (9).
To interpret this system in terms of debt-deﬂation, consider ﬁrst goods market equilibrium in t in
view of ﬁgure 1. The expression in brackets represents the wealth eﬀect from old ﬁrms’ losses (20).
Starting from steady state (pt = 1), one observes that, given (s − st), an asset price decline δt tends
to produce deﬂation (Minsky2 in ﬁgure 1). However, (s − st) is not given: with γ < 1, a low price
level pt encourages household spending: pt < 1 ⇔ st > s is implied by the Euler equation. This is
an intertemporal Pigou eﬀect.43 Cancelling terms in GMt shows that households’ extra spending in
equilibrium exactly oﬀsets the wealth eﬀect,
st − s = qhδt. (28)
43 More precisely, it is an intertemporal substitution eﬀect reminiscent of Pigou’s. In both cases, a lower price level
encourages greater real spending. But the Pigou eﬀect, strictly speaking, is a wealth eﬀect on outside money which is
absent in this model. (Nor do households enjoy a permanent increase in the real value of deposits, since the price level
reverts to p = 1.)
22The price level would not fall if households willingly spent that much more at unchanged prices.44










< 1 if δt > 0. (29)
Deﬂation then causes a second wealth eﬀect (Fisher-Tobin): the sales revenue old ﬁrms lose to
deﬂation, (1−pt)y, reduces their proﬁts, and thereby entrepreneurs’ spending on other ﬁrms’ goods.
This new gap in aggregate spending is not oﬀset. Therefore, although deﬂation does attract extra
spending by lenders, this less than compensates for the reduced spending by borrowers, as Tobin
suggested. (Borrowers’ marginal propensity to consume eﬀectively equals 1.) As a result, when
δt > 0, aggregate spending in t falls short of steady state spending in t−1, consistent with deﬂation.
Goods market equilibrium in t + 1 rests on the same logic. Relative to steady state, the price level
falls when households have to ‘plug the hole’ in aggregate demand. This happens following ﬁrms’
loss (19), which again consists of asset market losses and sales revenue lost to deﬂation. However, as
a result of reoptimization (22), only a fraction of the loss falls on aggregate demand, the remainder
falls on user cost spending, and thereby on the asset market AMt.
It remains to determine whether the asset price in t declines in the ﬁrst place. To see that it does,
suppose ﬁrst that δt = 0. A positive payment ρ implies that ﬁrms will spend less on holding assets
than they would have in steady state. Similarly, the lower pt+1, the more ﬁrms will reduce their
spending in (22); the unexpected shortfall in future revenue means that their net worth is lower than
expected when they had purchased assets in t − 1. Hence, deﬂation tends to reduce the asset price
(Fisher-Minsky in ﬁgure 1).45
But once the asset price decline is positive, it feeds back on itself (Minsky1): δt itself appears on
the right-hand side of AMt. The decline causes a loss to ﬁrms already holding assets, and is thus
reﬂected in their reduced spending on assets (21). The asset price decline then causes the wealth
eﬀect with which we started the argument above.
Note, however, that the system contains no independent eﬀect from money (Fisher) or credit
(Bernanke) to the goods and asset markets. The absence of these channels is due to the perfectly
elastic provision of credit and inside money, a point taken up in section 5.2.
4.2 Stability and propagation
With the channels of debt-deﬂation in place, we can examine their stability and propagation for
shocks of any size. Considering the limit case of a zero shock means that we only drop the perfect
foresight assumption for t. This allows to discriminate whether debt-deﬂation is fully endogenous, as
agents’ general equilibrium responses alone produce debt-deﬂation, or whether it merely propagates
shocks, as discussed in section 1.4.
44 They would only do so with inﬁnite intertemporal elasticity of substitution (γ = 0, linear utility).
45 A contemporaneous relation between deﬂation and asset price decline would be obtained under the slightly
diﬀerent timing assumption that ﬁrms sell goods when mid-age, not when old.
23The system (27) is “deviation amplifying”, as Minsky conjectured. Ampliﬁcation manifests itself in
two ways:
• Feedback within markets: deﬂation exacerbates deﬂation, and the asset price decline reacts on
itself.
• Feedback across markets: today’s asset price decline causes deﬂation, and future deﬂation in
turn exacerbates today’s asset price decline.
Clearly, price deviations amplify each other. It does not follow, however, that debt-deﬂation becomes
unstable. The feedbacks, although positive, are not destabilising, just as the associated multipliers,
although greater than one, are ﬁnite.
To see this, consider ﬁrst feedback within markets: in AMt, the coeﬃcient on δt is θ0/2 < 1, and the
asset market multiplier (1 − θ0/2)






ρ + (1 − pt+1)y/R

. (30)
Similarly, solving GMt+1 for (1−pt+1) results in a deﬂation multiplier of θ0−1.47 Similarly, feedback
across markets is not destabilising either: although the asset price decline and future deﬂation
reinforce each other, combining AMt and GMt+1 shows that
δt =
1 − θ0
2 − θ0 [δt + ...].
As this coeﬃcient lies below 1/2, feedback remains stable across markets. Finally, note that feedbacks
within and across markets fall over time.48 These results, taken together, show that the system
remains stable in the no-default region.




AM: δt = θ0








Each locus represents combinations of δt and pt+1 such that asset and goods markets are in equi-
librium, as shown in ﬁgure 3. The AM-locus has a negative slope: the lower the price level, the
greater the asset price decline – deﬂation depresses the asset price. The GM-locus, provided γ < 1,
is increasing and convex. The thick lines, drawn for ρ = 0, intersect at the steady state, δt = 0 and
46 The coeﬃcient θ
0 equals
θ
1+(1−θ)R (see appendix A1), and reaches its maximum of 1 as θ reaches 1.
47 The inﬁnite multiplier in GMt does not induce instability for reasons explained following (28).
48 This happens for two reasons. First, reoptimization allows agents to spread their losses across markets. For
example, deﬂation feedback fall from 1 in GMt to (1 − θ
0) in GMt+1. Second, from t+1 onward no unexpected losses
arise anymore. The complete system is shown in appendix B1.
49 We have used the fact that the equilibrium values (27) simplify the budget constraint (26) to (s − st) +
(s − st+1)/R = −ρ. This relation allows to replace GMt+1 by (28).
24pt+1 = 1. This illustrates proposition 3(a) that a zero shock leaves the economy in steady state.50












A positive shock ρ > 0 shifts the loci to the positions indicated by thin lines. AM shifts out to
AM’, because mid-age ﬁrms paying ρ spend less on assets, for any given pt+1. GM shifts down,
because the price level falls to attract households’ extra spending of ρ.51 The intersection of thin
curves shows the new equilibrium, with a small asset price decline and a lower future price level.
Substituting AM into GM delivers the implicit solution pt+1 (ρ),
pt+1 =
h
1 + (1 − m)Rρ/s − m(1 − pt+1)y/s
i γ
γ−1 (32)
where m ≡ θ0/(2 − θ0) simpliﬁes notation. A zero shock leaves the price level unchanged, pt+1 (0) = 1.
The greater the shock, the lower the price level, p0
t+1(ρ) < 0, for any γ > 0 (appendix B2 shows the
















The direct eﬀect of the shock ρ is to produce an asset price decline of mρ/(qh). This decline is
reinforced by a general equilibrium eﬀect: future deﬂation hurts mid-age ﬁrms who spend less on










δ0 (ρ) < 0.




t (ρ) < 0. As a result, ﬁrms’ losses Ω and Ω0 increase monotonically in ρ, and their balance
sheets progressively deteriorate. This is the result of several channels of debt-deﬂation, none of which
is destabilising. We now establish that the presence of default leaves this conclusion unaﬀected.
50 If γ > 1 instead, then the GM-locus would slope downward. This admits the possibility of self-fulﬁlling declines
in asset and goods prices, where δt > 0 and pt+1 < 1 are consistent with each other even as ρ = 0. See appendix B2
for detail.
51 Extra household spending is consistent with aggregate demand below steady state, because a low price level
implies reduced proﬁts for, and less spending by, ﬁrms in t + 1.
25Role of default. Perhaps surprisingly, default per se does not destabilise the system: defaulting
borrowers no longer spend, hence they cannot further reduce their spending when prices continue
to fall. In other words, the default of a class of agents removes their reactions from the markets
in which they participate, reducing feedback within and across markets. For instance, if old ﬁrms
default, they spend nothing on goods. Hence GMt of (27) only consists of household spending,
GMt pty = st
Default eliminates both the feedbacks of Minsky2 and Fisher-Tobin in t.52 Combining GMt with the
Euler equation implies that pt reaches the ﬂoor
p = εγ = [ε + (1 − ε)θ]
γ < 1 for γ > 0.
Note that there is no deﬂation, in spite of default, when IES is inﬁnite (γ = 0). The less responsive
household spending (the greater γ), the more the equilibrium price level must fall to attract spend-
ing. The other two market conditions, AMt and GMt+1, remain unchanged, and jointly determine
{δt,pt+1} as in (31).
Similar conclusions hold for the default of mid-age ﬁrms, which removes all the feedbacks emanating
from them. They no longer spend on consumption in GMt+1, nor on assets in AMt. Correspondingly,





Finally, should both old and mid-age ﬁrms default, then pt, pt+1 and δt are all constants. Although
at a low level, prices stabilize upon default. More generally, in a model containing more types of
agents, ﬁrms’ default can be shown to slow down the price decline, which will come to a halt only
when all borrowers on the demand side default. The more agents default, the fewer and weaker
the feedbacks in the system.53 In conclusion, the system also remains stable even when wide-spread
default is taken into account – default per se is not destabilising. This qualiﬁer distinguishes default
from its side-eﬀects which can be destabilising, as illustrated by Bernanke’s credit channel (section
5.2).
Role of indebtedness. Higher indebtedness means that agents default more readily, following
smaller shocks. But stability is preserved since default per se is not destabilising. More precisely,
ﬁrms purchase assets on credit, and the resulting indebtedness can be measured by asset preference θ





. This is conﬁrmed by using θ = 1, hence θ0 = 1, throughout this section. For
example, greater indebtedness implies a greater impact on the asset market: the multiplier in (30)
52 Formally, qhδt + (1 − pt)y in (27) is replaced by a constant, pc = (1 − θ)Π. Firms’ reduction in spending
equals their entire steady state spending.
53 An earlier version contained a general approach for assessing stability based on the analogy with input-output
tables: the ‘inputs’ are the price deviations on the right of (27), including default terms; the outputs are the resulting
price changes on the left. Hence the coeﬃcient matrix collects the feedbacks within markets (diagonal) and across
markets (oﬀ-diagonal), and the Leontief inverse yields the corresponding multipliers. While positive feedbacks imply
that multipliers exceeding unity, they do not imply system instability. The zeros placed by defaults make the feedback
matrix become sparse, and the Leontief inverse approaches the identity matrix, indicating greater stability.
26increases, but it remains bounded by 2. Greater indebtedness also reduces ﬁrms’ ability to withstand
losses. Old ﬁrms with θ = 1, for instance, would default following any positive loss, since the buﬀer
for absorbing, planned consumption (1 − θ)Π, would be zero. But again, a greater propensity to
default does not destabilise the system when default itself does not.
Role of the shock. Having compared the systems with and without default, it remains to determine
the default point. The size of the shock at which mid-age ﬁrms default, ρ0, is given by54




It takes a greater ρ0 to bankrupt ﬁrms when deﬂation is less pronounced, and the second term
disappears completely at the ﬁxed-price limit (γ = 0).55 Once mid-age ﬁrms default, prices remain




q for any ρ ≥ ρ0, because ρ0 is the largest feasible payment from
ﬁrms to households net of loan losses.56 Therefore, the conclusion that the system remains stable
holds for shocks of any size.
To conclude we return to proposition 3. We have shown that the steady state continues unless
there is some positive shock. This favours the interpretation of debt-deﬂation as a propagation
mechanism, rather than as a fully endogenous phenomenon.57 Goods and asset prices are decreasing
in the size of this shock. This was found to be the result of several active channels of debt-deﬂation,
yet the deviations they produce within and across markets do not amplify each other to the point
of producing instability. Indeed, under the optimal policy of user cost spending the system remains
globally stable. Greater shocks and greater indebtedness produce greater distress selling and wide-
spread default. But default per se is not destabilizing in our model without frictions and uncertainty.
Also, there are no independent eﬀects from money or credit to the goods and asset markets. Hence
the channels of Fisher, Tobin and Minsky are not destabilising, and that of Bernanke does not exist
in our model. The economy remains surprisingly resilient to shocks, even with wide-spread default.
The predictions of unstable debt-deﬂation are not borne out under the present assumptions. A useful
perspective on these results can be obtained by examining directly a centrepiece of debt-deﬂation:
distress selling.
54 This threshold is found by equating the loss Ω
0 with the ability to withstand losses, pc/R+uh, or, equivalently,
by equating the two expressions for the asset price decline: (33), and (30) evaluated at p.
55 Conversely, even as ρ
0 = 0, it is still possible that ﬁrms default following strong deﬂation for unfavourable
parameters (including γ >> 1).
56 Any payment exceeding ρ
0 leads mid-age ﬁrms to default; although they will hold no assets, their goods in
transit will be sold next period for py, unless the payment ρ is not eﬀected. It is in the interest of the bank to ﬁnance
any payment ρ < ρ
0 + py, as doing so maximizes loss-given-default, λ
0 = (ρ − ρ
0). Thus when households receive a
payment ρ > ρ
0, the bank also passes through loan losses λ
0, limiting the eﬀective payment to households to ρ−λ
0 = ρ
0.
57 See the discussion in section 1.4. Of course we concede that the model does not capture important qualitative
features of Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, namely ﬁnancial innovation, fundamental uncertainty, and the
endogenous evolution of the debt structure. It remains unclear how (or even whether) these features can be modelled,
see Foley (2001).
274.3 Distress selling versus reﬁnancing
We now quantify distress selling by mid-age ﬁrms. The purpose of distress selling is to prevent
consumption from bearing all the burden of adjustment. This is why the loss is shared, between
reduced spending on consumption and assets, under the optimal policy (21). Mapping user cost
spending uth0














This is the distress selling function for an arbitrary δt. But distress selling in turn determines the














= 0 if ρ = 0
> ρ if ρ > 0.
(34)
When δt = 0, the expression equals 0. (No distress selling occurs in steady state as ρ = 0.) When




qh, the remaining value of total asset holdings at the default price. In
between those extremes, the relation is positive: the greater distress selling, the greater the asset
price decline, and vice versa. The exact dependence on ρ can be obtained by replacing δt with (31).
In equilibrium, distress selling is unambiguously positive whenever the shock is, and it generally
exceeds ρ.59 This shows that ﬁrms sell assets not merely to cover their liquidity needs ρ, but also
to reduce their nominal debt. Nonetheless, our earlier ﬁnding that debt-deﬂation remains stable is
reﬂected here in the fact that distress selling does not destabilise the asset market.
The reﬁnancing equilibrium. So far, we have studied the equilibrium resulting from user cost
spending. We now compare this to the equilibrium resulting from reﬁnancing (described on page 19).
The diﬀerence can then be attributed to distress selling.
As mid-age ﬁrms reﬁnance their holdings, the asset market comprises old ﬁrms selling h assets to
young ﬁrms. Since pt+2 = 1 as in (27), assets turn over at the steady state price qt = q, consistent
with δt = 0 in (34). Goods market clearing in t + 1 now requires st+1 = s + Rρ.60 Therefore,
reﬁnancing results in the following equilibrium prices,
δt = 0












58 We use the deﬁnition δt ≡ (q − qt)/q and ut = qt − qt+1/R, where qt+1 = q is known from previous results.
59 To show qt (h − h
0
t) − ρ > 0, use (34) and multiply across (R − 1)/R − δt. The expression is increasing in
δt. From (30) we know that δt ≥
θ0ρ
(2−θ0)qh for any γ < 1. Cancelling terms, one ﬁnds the suﬃcient (not necessary)
condition that θ
0/(2 − θ






. This is a mild restriction
on θ (e.g. when R = 1.05, θ = 0.17.)
60 Adapting GMt+1 in (27) for reﬁnancing involves setting θ
0 = 0 and δt = 0.
28Reﬁnancing eﬀectively shields the asset market from the shock ρ. There is no asset price decline,
no wealth eﬀect, and thus no deﬂation in t. In this sense, reﬁnancing prevents debt-deﬂation
in t. This provides some support to Minsky’s contention that debt-deﬂation does not develop when
agents reﬁnance (see p. 9). But reﬁnancing means to continue ﬁnancing assets. What is not saved
on assets now must be saved on goods next period. Thus reﬁnancing delays the impact of the
shock, concentrating it on the goods market in t + 1. The interest cost of increased borrowing Rρ
reduces ﬁnal period consumption, producing more future deﬂation than would otherwise be the case,
p
ref
t+1 < pt+1 (ρ) in (31).61
Comparing the general equilibrium consequences of reﬁnancing and distress selling suggests several
observations. Distress selling spreads the impact of a redistributive shock across markets, causing
prices to fall already in t. Doing so imposes a negative externality on other asset holders: old ﬁrms
would face no losses in the reﬁnancing scenario. Their equilibrium loss Ω in (19) can therefore be
attributed to mid-age ﬁrms’ distress selling and the resulting deﬂation in t. An equivalent way to see
this point is to express old ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial condition in real terms. The last line of (3) reads
R2qh + w − λ
pt




This expression shows clearly how the fall in pt raises the burden of debt and wage liabilities (left),
compared to the ability to pay (right).62 If old ﬁrms fail, it is ultimately because they are forced
to sell at depressed prices, pt and qt, only because other ﬁrms decided to engage in distress selling.
Incidentally, note that knowing the real asset price in (36) is insuﬃcient when the issue is the
repayment of nominal debt. This is why we conducted the analysis in nominal terms.
As a ﬁnal observation, since distress selling aﬀects asset prices, it must also have implications for
money and credit.
4.4 Money, credit, and asset prices
Recall from (18) that the debt of mid-age ﬁrms evolves as follows,
B0
t = RB + ρ − qt(h − h0
t).
Under reﬁnancing, ﬁrms borrow ρ to eﬀect the necessary payment without selling assets (h0
t = h).
Their debt thus increases to B0
t = RB + ρ. Meanwhile, young ﬁrms borrow B = qh, as in steady
state, since δt = 0 in (35). The banking system therefore expands to Bt + B0
t = (1 + R)qh + ρ.
This expansion by ρ, relative to steady state (16), is of course consistent with households leaving the
incoming payment ρ on deposit.63 Thus the banking system must expand to support the reﬁnancing
61 Reﬁnancing would maintain all prices at their steady state values only in the case of a pure liquidity shock. If
ρ in t were reversed by a repayment of Rρ in t + 1, the present value of the loss is zero.
62 The term λ represents non-performing loans and prevents negative consumption when debt exceed the ability
to repay, see (44) in appendix A1.
63 What encourages households to save their payment until t+1 is a higher real interest rate between t and t+1,
namely rt = R
pt
pt+1 > R, using (35).
29of the asset market; and deposits, in equilibrium, exactly match the increase in lending.
Fisher’s debt-deﬂation can be thought as a story of why such reﬁnancing will not happen: borrowers
do not wish to take on more debt, but engage in distress selling to repay debt and, in doing so, they
cause a deﬂationary contraction of bank deposits (page 4). The present analysis largely supports
this view, up to the conclusion.
It is true that we found distress selling to be an equilibrium phenomenon under optimal user cost
spending. It is also true that distress selling is used for repaying debt: by virtue of (34), mid-age
ﬁrms reduce their debt to B0
t < RB. But whereas mid-age ﬁrms borrow less, young ﬁrms borrow
more.64 Just as the repayment of old loans contracts deposits, the creation of new loans expands
deposits. The banking system in fact expands. Using (18) in (10) shows that the value of bank
assets equals
(1 + R)qh + (ρ − qhδt).
This is, of course, identical to the value of deposits which, using (28), equals
Dt = RD + ρ − st = D + (ρ − qhδt).
Both sides of the balance sheet indicate that the size of the banking system, relative to steady
state (15), increases by ρ − qhδt.65 This conclusion remains unaﬀected by borrower default: the
banking system still expands, even after writing oﬀ non-performing loans (see page 34).
These ﬁndings cast some doubt on Fisher’s conclusion, whereby the contraction of money, brought
about by distress selling, causes a fall in the price level. First, no monetary contraction takes
place when new borrowing exceeds the repayment by distress-selling agents. Second, and more
importantly, even if a monetary contraction took place, it would not be the cause of deﬂation here.
In our frictionless environment, credit is elastic and money causally last. The quantity of money
(deposits) depends on st, which is determined by the equilibrium asset price decline. It is the price
of assets, rather than the quantity of money, that drives debt-deﬂation. In this respect the model
lends less support to Fisher’s than to Minsky’s channel.
We collect the above ﬁndings in
Proposition 4 Distress selling and monetary implications
(a) Distress selling versus reﬁnancing:
• Distress selling exceeds liquidity needs and reduces ﬁrms’ nominal debt.
• Distress selling imposes losses on other asset holders, by spreading the impact of the shock.
• Reﬁnancing, by contrast, would prevent debt-deﬂation in t.
(b) Money, credit, and asset prices:
• Young ﬁrms increase their borrowing more than mid-age ﬁrms reduce theirs.
• The banking system expands, and the asset price decline remains small.
• The price of assets, rather than the quantity of money, drives debt-deﬂation.
64 Young ﬁrms spend utht = uh, hence qtht =
qt




R−q/qt > (R − 1)/R ≡ q/u.
65 This diﬀerence is positive since we found that pt+1 < 1 in (31).
30Finally, note that the expansion of the banking system also means that the asset price decline remains
very modest. This is not due to our assumption of a perfect asset market.66 Instead, it is the policy
of user cost spending that sustains both the level of asset prices and the size of the banking system.
User cost, as a dynamic concept, incorporates the fact that every discount comes with as much
expected appreciation. It is agents’ willingness to get more indebted and buy assets at a discount
that keeps this discount so small. Indeed, for user cost to remain positive, the asset price decline
cannot exceed (R − 1)/R, and it does not exceed δ = (R − 1)/(2R) in the present context; and
since the asset price decline is modest, so is the wealth eﬀect and deﬂation.
5 Unstable debt-deﬂation
The previous section concluded that debt-deﬂation remains stable under the optimal policy of user
cost spending, as agents are able and willing to borrow and exploit the expected asset price recovery.
In this section we demonstrate that debt-deﬂation can become unstable when agents are unable or
unwilling to follow this course. First, in the spirit of Fisher, we consider what happens when agents
actively contain their indebtedness (see page 4). Second, in the spirit of Bernanke, we consider what
happens when banks, following borrower default, actively reduce bank lending (page 7).
5.1 Containing indebtedness
We deﬁned indebtedness as debt relative to net worth in (17), and assume that ﬁrms observe this
level, for instance as a result of margin requirements (see page 37). Following the shock, ﬁrms
become over-indebted at the existing level of nominal debt. Net worth falls by the loss Ω0, and real
indebtedness increases accordingly, unless nominal debt is reduced. As was shown in (24), keeping
real indebtedness constant calls for distress selling worth a multiple of the loss. We now consider the
general equilibrium implications of this policy. This is best done in two steps, to illustrate how far
distress selling can drive the asset price.
(a) Suppose ﬁrst that only mid-age ﬁrms, those directly aﬀected by the shock, seek to contain
their indebtedness.67 Distress selling, (h − h0
t) = (ρ + LΩ0)/qt, must be absorbed by young ﬁrms’
demand, ht = uhpt+2/ut. Since equilibrium requires ht + h0




pt+2 = 1 +
ρ + LΩ0
qth.
While the value of distress selling can be substantial, it cannot exceed total holdings qth. The last
term reaches 1 when mid-age ﬁrms sell out. Even so, user cost falls at most to half its steady
66 A previous version illustrated this claim with two examples. The ﬁrst, in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
assumed that assets are not fully redeployable (e.g. residential versus commercial property). The second example
mimicked the absence of unconstrained investors by removing the young generation. In neither case was the asset price
decline substantially greater.
67 Meanwhile, young ﬁrms follow the optimal policy of user cost, derived in appendix A1.
31state value,68




To absorb all assets of defaulting ﬁrms, it suﬃces to halve the user cost to motivate young ﬁrms
to buy twice as many assets as in steady state. This can be achieved with a very small asset price
decline, such that the subsequent appreciation covers half the interest cost of debt. Again, even
wide-spread distress selling hardly reduces the asset price when young ﬁrms follow their policy of user
cost spending (as on page 26). In fact, the presence of a young generation, without any prior debt
or losses, is like assuming that there are investors with unlimited access to funds, ready to arbitrage
any opportunities. As before, young ﬁrms are able and willing to borrow and exploit the expected
asset price recovery, which was shown to stabilise the market.
(b) Suppose now that all ﬁrms seek to contain their indebtedness. This replaces user cost spending
by the sort of reaction Fisher had in mind. Young ﬁrms’ keeping their indebtedness equal to (17)
means that their debt cannot exceed a certain value, irrespective of the saving aﬀorded by future
appreciation. They now spend a ﬁxed amount on assets, rather than on user cost (appendix A3),
qtht = qhpt+2.
The asset market clears when the price decline produced by distress selling attracts an equal measure
of extra demand from young ﬁrms,
AM: qh[δt − (1 − pt+2)] = ρ + LΩ0
= ρ + L

qhδt + ρ + (1 − pt+1)y/R

. (38)
The coeﬃcient on δt equals qh(1 − L). According to its sign, two cases arise.
Low indebtedness (L < 1). Low indebtedness in (17) would follow from a very low preference




/R2. In this case, all previous results remain qualitatively
unchanged. A zero shock (ρ = 0) requires no distress selling, and the continued steady state remains





ρ + (1 − pt+1)y/R

+ z,
where z is a residual.70 Comparing with the earlier expression (30) indicates stronger feedback, as
the multiplier is greater here than under user cost spending (L > θ > θ0). Nonetheless, with low
indebtedness, the response of the asset price and, consequently that of price levels, remains stable
as in section 4. The diﬀerence is mainly quantitative: for a given ρ, asset and goods prices deviate
more from the steady state than was the case under user cost spending.
68 As appendix B2 remains valid, the price level still reverts to pt+2 = 1, thus the asset price reverts to qt+1 = q.
Using qt − q/R = (q − q/R)/2 then yields the last expression.
69 This can be shown as follows: assuming pt+1 < 1 implies δt > 0. This leads to pt < 1 and, through the
intertemporal budget constraint pt+1 > 1, contradicting the initial assumption. The only solution is δt = 0 and
pt = pt+1 = 1.
70 The residual equals z ≡ [ρ/(qh) + (1 − pt+2)]/(1 − L).
32High indebtedness (L > 1). Major qualitative diﬀerences arise when indebtedness exceeds unity,




/R2 in most of its range). The negative coeﬃcient
qh(1 − L) means that a falling asset price itself is generating more distress selling than attracting
new spending. Not even the losses arising from δt can be covered, much less the exogenous loss ρ.
Distress selling now destabilises the market, and any positive shock ρ triggers the unstable debt-
deﬂation process Fisher and Minsky envisioned.71
One can imagine the dynamics as follows. In steady state, with a zero shock, no distress selling
is necessary and there is no asset price decline. Now mid-age ﬁrms get hit by the shock ρ, which
reduces their net worth by as much at current prices. To keep their debt constant, they must raise ρ
through distress selling. But they are still over-indebted, since their net worth has fallen. To keep
their indebtedness constant, they must raise an additional Lρ. If this were of no consequence to
equilibrium prices, the process would stop right there, since the balance between debt and net worth
would be restored.
At this point the general equilibrium eﬀects set in. As an aggregate shock, ρ aﬀects all mid-age
ﬁrms. Their distress selling, however small, reduces the asset price, as was the case in (34). All
asset holders now realise that δt > 0 reduces their net worth and leaves them all over-indebted.
To contain their indebtedness, they aggressively sell assets to repay debt. But in aggregate this
attempt is self-defeating, as raising L times the asset market loss that resulted from the initial sales
will further depress prices. At the same time, falling asset prices cause wealth eﬀects on the goods
markets, and deﬂation adds further losses and further distress selling.72
In sum, ﬁrms sell assets so aggressively that, in aggregate, prices and net worth fall faster than the
repayment that distress selling was meant to achieve. The unstable process comes to a halt only
when the whole stock of assets has been sold in distress. This happens when the right-hand side




pt+2 ⇒ δt = (1 − pt+2/2). (39)













The asset price decline (39) is substantial, close to 50% when pt+2 → 1 (when γ → 0). Under user
cost spending, it was suﬃcient to halve the user cost (37) to motivate young ﬁrms to buy up all the
assets. When containing indebtedness, however, it becomes necessary to halve the asset price (39)
to allow them to do so. This large a decline invariably leads to wide-spread default among ﬁrms, for
most θ ∈ [0,1].
71 With reference to ﬁgure 1, the destabilising channel is the asset market feedback of Minsky1, and deﬂation
is produced through the channel of Minsky2 (see ﬁgure 1). This is reinforced by deﬂation, through the channels of
Fisher-Tobin. The channels are the same as before, and so are the sources of losses. The only change we have made
is to replace the optimal user cost spending by a policy of constant indebtedness in the spirit of Fisher.
72 As the asset price keeps falling, the wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand grow larger, and produce more and
more deﬂation until pt and pt+1 hit their lower bound p= ε
γ.
33Fisher’s and Minsky’s main predictions of section 1 now materialise: the more the economic boat
tips, the more it tends to tip – the system does amplify deviations to the point of instability. Distress
selling is self-defeating, and a recursive debt-deﬂation process ensues, ending in almost universal
bankruptcy. This stands in sharp contrast to previous results where debt-deﬂation remained stable
even in the presence of large shocks, high indebtedness, and wide-spread default.
5.2 Impaired intermediation
Bernanke’s credit channel has remained inactive so far, because our elastic credit speciﬁcation has
the banking system accommodate credit demand. (With neither agency problems nor uncertainty,
the banking system is willing to lend in line with ﬁrms’ intertemporal budget constraints. It is also
able to do so since neither reserve, nor settlement, nor capital constraints are imposed here.) So far,
even wide-spread default did not produce any feedback from the banking system to the economy.
We now consider what happens when the banking system actively reduces bank lending, following
borrower default.
Credit expansion. We ﬁrst observe that the size of the banking system would normally increase
following the shock. This can be shown using the bank balance sheet identity. Bank assets, given
by (10) and (18), are diminished by loan losses of mid-age ﬁrms λ0 (see page 21).73 Equivalently,
bank deposits are diminished by loan losses and household spending,
(1 + R)qh + ρ − qhδ − λ0 ≡ RD + ρ − λ+ − st. (41)
where D = (1 + R)qh is the size of the banking system in steady state (16). Both sides show that
the banking system expands by
ρ − qhδt − λ0 > 0.
This expression was shown to be positive, absent default (page 30). Writing oﬀ loan losses merely
moderates the expansion to (εγ − ε)y/R > 0.74 The expansion remains positive because the max-
imum asset price decline, δ, was found to be small under user cost spending. Thus elastic credit
leads to a natural, unconstrained size of the banking system greater than in steady state.
Credit contraction. We now allow for the possibility that bank credit becomes less accommodative
following borrower defaults. As emphasised by Bernanke (1983), borrower insolvencies impair the
channels of credit intermediation (page 7). While there is no role for screening and monitoring
in our model, we can replicate Bernanke’s channel by assuming that loan losses lead to a credit
contraction or an equivalent increase in the loan rate. As this mechanism was developed in detail in
von Peter (2004), we only sketch the aspects most relevant for debt-deﬂation.
Suppose the banking system reduces the supply of credit, while positive, by a coeﬃcient κ times the
73 The balance sheet at time t records lending to young and mid-age ﬁrms. Old ﬁrms have left the model and are
no longer recorded (see page 15). Their loan losses, if positive, are already accounted for.
74 The expression is valid whether or not old ﬁrms default. It is found by using the deﬁnition of λ
0 in (46), steady
state parameter relations, and the equilibrium default values δ and p (page 26).
34loan losses it suﬀers,
Credit Supply: (1 + R)qh − κλ+.
Passively writing oﬀ loan losses corresponds to κ = 1, while actively reducing bank credit involves
κ > 1. Note that this new constraint is relevant only if ﬁrms default.75 Once this happens, the
constraint starts binding for any κ > 0, since credit demand at R was shown to exceed (1+R)qh in
(41). The credit contraction will therefore raise the loan rate, Rt > R, bringing credit demand down
to reduced credit supply.76 Moreover, if credit is constrained, so are asset prices. The contraction
will therefore drive the asset price decline beyond δ.
It becomes apparent that this form of impaired bank intermediation can produce unstable debt-
deﬂation. Equating credit demand (41) with constrained credit supply, one obtains an expression for
asset prices,
qhδ − ρ = κλ + (κ − 1)λ0.
Loan losses λ or λ0 are positive only if old or mid-age ﬁrms default. If so, then λ and λ0 contain
the term qhδ, since ﬁrms’ losses on assets contribute to loan losses. The asset price is no longer
determined by a forward-looking asset pricing equation, but constrained by current credit availability,
If only mid-age ﬁrms default: δ = (κ − 1)δ + ...
If both types of ﬁrms default: δ = (2κ − 1)δ + ...
This equation can be compared to the earlier expressions in the stable case (27), and the unstable
case (38). Here, the asset price decline appears on the right-hand side because of Bernanke’s, not
Minsky’s, channel: δ causes losses to ﬁrms, hence loan losses to banks - this disrupts credit supply,
which in turn accelerates the asset price decline.
This feedback from the banking system destabilises the asset market when the loss coeﬃcient κ
exceeds a threshold. If only mid-age ﬁrms default, writing oﬀ λ0 already contributes 1 to κ, and
κ > 2 is suﬃcient for instability. When old ﬁrms also default, instability already ensues with κ > 1.
As a rule of thumb, instability ensues when κ exceeds a passive write-oﬀ by one (see footnote 73).
Credit supply then systematically falls short of credit demand until both collapse to zero (δ = 1). The
unstable debt-deﬂation process again involves falling asset prices, increasing losses, and deﬂationary
wealth eﬀects on the goods market, as described in section 5.1.77 The main diﬀerence is that credit
contraction, rather than distress selling, now destabilises the asset market.
While proposition 3(b) showed that default per se is not destabilising, this no longer holds when
default aﬀects credit intermediation. The problems of credit intermediation that Bernanke has in
mind, or other constraints, may well place κ above the instability threshold. In von Peter (2004)
75 The channel becomes active only when default takes place, after the “margins of safety” have been exhausted.
This may be contrasted with Fisher and Minsky’s channel (section 5.1), or with models where ﬁnancial frictions drive
up the borrowing rate as soon as net worth falls (e.g. Bernanke et al 1999).
76 For a given spending on user cost in (6) and (21), a higher loan rate translates into a smaller loan.
77 Although Bernanke considered the eﬀect on aggregate demand, the credit channel here aﬀects asset prices,
because assets rather than goods are purchased on bank credit, as emphasised by Keynes (section 1.3).
35we show that this is indeed the case when banks choose, or capital adequacy forces them to keep
their leverage constant; the coeﬃcient κ then equals the inverse of bank leverage, which exceeds the
stability threshold.
The results of this section are summarised in
Proposition 5 Unstable debt-deﬂation
(a) When borrowers contain their indebtedness:
• Debt-deﬂation becomes unstable if indebtedness exceeds the threshold L = 1.
• Distress selling destabilises the asset market.
• The process stops when asset prices reach about half their steady state value.
(b) When default impairs credit intermediation:
• Debt-deﬂation becomes unstable if the loss coeﬃcient exceeds the threshold κ = 2.
• The credit contraction destabilises the asset market.
• The process stops when asset prices and credit collapse to zero.
The two instances of unstable debt-deﬂation share some features. Both can be thought of as
interfering with optimal user cost spending, since agents do not or cannot take on more debt. In both
instances the asset market is liable to instability, and warrants a central place in the debt-deﬂation
process. Money, credit and asset prices contract in line with each other. (Figure 1 purposely aligns
them at the same height.) In both cases it is the price of assets, rather than the quantity of money,
that drives debt-deﬂation; the price of assets was driven by distress selling in the ﬁrst case, and by
a credit contraction in the second.
6 Discussion
The stylised nature of our model of debt-deﬂation raises some issues worth mentioning. The discus-
sion addresses stability, modelling assumptions, and the relevance of debt-deﬂation for today.
6.1 Stability and indebtedness
The main results of the paper can be restated in terms of three possible reactions to losses. Under
reﬁnancing, debt-deﬂation does not develop as agents refrain from distress selling. Under user cost
spending, debt-deﬂation remains stable, because agents are willing to borrow and exploit the expected
recovery, which stabilises asset prices. Under constant indebtedness, however, debt-deﬂation can
become unstable. A credit crunch similarly constrains the indebtedness agents can incur.
But the optimal policy was shown to be user cost spending, with the property that agents are not
concerned with debt per se (remarks on page 12). Rather than an explicit reaction to debt, distress
selling in (34) was the result of allocating losses between spending on goods and assets. A much
greater amount of distress selling arose under constant indebtedness. This raises the question: why
would agents choose to contain their indebtedness?
36One reason could be uncertainty, as discussed below. Another reason could be regulation, for instance
margin requirements. Margin is the fraction a customer must contribute in own funds toward an
asset position. The amount purchased on credit is thereby limited to a fraction of the value of
assets.78 Margin requirements therefore enforce constant indebtedness (leverage). Indeed, Fisher’s
original exposition already emphasised margin accounts, and he observed that falling stock prices
made (callable) brokers’ loans almost disappear (Fisher 1932, p. 87ﬀ). Accordingly, our results on
distress selling can be interpreted in terms of margin calls, and our notion of unstable debt-deﬂation
can be compared with what has, or could have, happened in actual market crashes as 1929 and
1987.79
This interpretation suggests a policy lesson. Indebtedness is as much a blessing as a curse: greater
indebtedness produces more distress selling, but it also enlarges the ability of other agents to ab-
sorb the extra supply, which was shown to be stabilising. Margin requirements can jeopardise this
mechanism in a falling market. The theory suggests three cases. First, in a world of optimal user
cost spending, introducing margin requirements could do more harm than good, because they force
agents to contain their indebtedness which was shown to be destabilising. By contrast, a world
where agents curb their indebtedness for some other reason is already potentially unstable. In that
case, introducing margin requirements ex ante may mitigate the inherent instability of the system,
provided they are strict enough to maintain initial indebtedness below the critical threshold. Finally,
imposing or tightening requirements at the time of a crisis fails on both counts: it does not prevent
high indebtedness ex ante, but constrains the increase in borrowing necessary for absorbing distress
sales ex post.
6.2 Welfare, real eﬀects, and extensions
The analysis was conducted in the context of an overlapping generations model. This structure
implies active markets and makes dealing with losses and default tractable. But it also reduces
persistence artiﬁcially, since aﬀected agents eventually exit the model. The corresponding arrival of
young agents is in fact one of the main reasons for the stability of the model: the presence of a
young generation, without any prior debt or losses, is like assuming investors with unlimited access
to funds.80 While considered good practice in asset pricing theory, the presence of such investors
tilts our results in favour of stability.81
Perhaps more contentious is our choice to illustrate debt-deﬂation in a frictionless model with ﬂexible
prices. We opted for price ﬂexibility because falling prices are at the very heart of debt-deﬂation. But
78 In the housing market, the corresponding notions are downpayment and loan-to-value.
79 These analogies are worked out in von Peter (2004b). Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) show that margin requirements
can explain overshooting of asset prices, but they do not consider instability.
80 Recall that credit is provided elastically, except in section 5.2. Margin requirements were found to be destabilising
because they restricted young ﬁrms’ access to credit.
81 We did, however, assume inﬁnitely-lived households. (They can equivalently be thought of as overlapping
generations with an operative bequest motive). Households would otherwise spend all deposits upfront; a long horizon
helps maintain the large volume of credit, deposits and intermediation. That households do not buy assets is a
simpliﬁcation of little consequence, as long as the model contains other unconstrained agents, able and willing to
purchase assets (young ﬁrms in this case).
37by the same token we obtain market clearing, full employment, and output at capacity. This means
that the real eﬀects are mostly distributional. During any period, output is split between ﬁrms and
households, and assets are split between young and mid-age ﬁrms. When deﬂation occurs, ﬁrms lose
in real terms, whereas households gain as their nominal spending buys a greater fraction of goods
supply. Similarly, when the asset price falls, mid-age ﬁrms lose assets to young ﬁrms who enter
the market free of losses and inherited debt. Compared with the steady state, such redistributions
are welfare-reducing in the aggregate. This is most obvious in the case of default, since defaulting
entrepreneurs consume nothing (V (0) = −∞). Distributional eﬀects have, in reality, often caused
considerable socio-economic problems.
But while our speciﬁcation highlights distributional eﬀects, it neglects important aggregate eﬀects. As
such, the model is clearly inadequate as a description of actual episodes, such as the Great Depression
(Christiano et al 2004 provide a recent attempt). Modelling output eﬀects would certainly be a useful
extension. A possibility that suggests itself is wage rigidity, an important factor in the Depression.
Appendix B4 shows that nominal wage rigidity indeed depresses employment and output to the
extent that the price level remains low, due to high real wages. Another possibility is to consider
assets (capital) in the production function. Distress selling will then have output eﬀects, whether in
the form of interrupted production or ineﬃcient distribution of assets across ﬁrms. The models of
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
all possess features suitable for pursuing this direction.82 Results on deﬂation will be less clear-cut
when aggregate supply falls alongside aggregate spending. We have not pursued this line here, to
keep in sharp relief the key features of the model.
Perhaps the most promising extension would be to incorporate uncertainty.83 Doing so would bring
the model closer to Fisher’s and especially Minsky’s views, and could change the results considerably.
We found that debt-deﬂation remains stable when agents follow their optimal policy of user cost
spending. The absence of uncertainty makes agents willing to take on more debt and purchase under-
valued assets, which stabilises the asset market. But agents’ attempt to contain their indebtedness
was shown to produce unstable debt-deﬂation. We suspect that the presence of uncertainty would
also work in a destabilising direction, since agents will be concerned with the prospect of bankruptcy
that comes with higher indebtedness; they would no longer exploit expected future appreciation as
aggressively as under perfect foresight. Whether uncertainty makes agents become as defensive as
described by Fisher and Minsky remains a question for future research.
6.3 Relevance for today
Can a theory inspired by the Great Depression be relevant for today? The theory does not require an
environment of absolute price level deﬂation. The analysis was conducted relative to a steady state
with constant prices. Alternatively, one could take a steady state with a constant inﬂation rate π
as the benchmark. When all nominal prices {p,w,q,u} and values {B,Π,D,s} grow at the rate π,
82 Necessary modiﬁcations would include nominal contracting and avoiding linearisation.
83 Note also that the combination of frictions and uncertainty might aﬀord further insights. Default may no longer
be so inconsequential; and the money supply might play a more causal role.
38and the nominal interest rate equals R = (1 + π)β−1, one arrives at the same real allocation as
in proposition 1. In particular, life-time asset holding again remains constant, h0 = h. Following
the shock, the same qualitative results hold, including those on distress selling and stability. Prices
may not fall in absolute terms, but they fall relative to debt, because debt grows at nominal interest
reﬂecting steady state inﬂation. Hence we believe that the mechanism studied in this model applies as
much to unexpected disinﬂation as to deﬂation. A diﬀerence would arise if the model were extended
to incorporate cash, bonds, and interest rate policy.84
Apart from the price level, the model highlighted the role of asset prices. Falling asset prices are as
harmful as deﬂation, and the asset market may well be more liable to instability. Asset price swings
can be a major concern, even in an environment of price stability (Borio and Lowe 2002). The
notion of debt-deﬂation must include asset prices. This also makes it applicable to recent episodes
of ﬁnancial distress. Wolfson (1996) made this point in reference to the 1987 stock market crash.
Broadening the scope by adding the exchange rate as a special asset price, could further extend the
domain of applicability to emerging market crises.
A related observation is that distress selling remains a relevant concept. Financial history is rich
in episodes of distress selling, as recounted by Kindleberger (1996). The concept starts to receive
attention from corporate ﬁnance (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1992, Brown et al 1994, Pulvino 1998).
It is also of interest from a macroprudential perspective: distress selling on a signiﬁcant scale may be
rare, but it raises policy concerns when it does occur. For example, the collapse of Long Term Capital
Management prompted the Federal Reserve to organise a private sector rescue and ease monetary
policy. This course of action was justiﬁed with the words
“The size and nature of the positions of this fund [LTCM] were such that their sudden liquidation
in already unsettled ﬁnancial markets could well have induced further ﬁnancial dislocations...”
FOMC Minutes, September 1998 p. 183
This statement refers to the threat that distress selling might destabilise the market. Similar con-
cerns followed the 1987 stock market crash, as margin calls produced considerable selling pressure
(Brimmer 1989). Thus, while the role of distress selling in debt-deﬂation was inspired by the Great
Depression, the notion arguably remains relevant when extended appropriately. From that perspec-
tive it is useful to consider distress selling in general equilibrium, as was attempted in the present
paper.
6.4 Conclusion
The Great Depression inspired the theory of debt-deﬂation, describing how debt and deﬂation desta-
bilise each other. In this paper we examined the channels of Fisher, Minsky, Tobin and Bernanke,
in the context of a model with assets, banking, distress selling, and default. In spite of its stylised
84 For instance, the inﬂationary economy would have more room for reducing interest rates without hitting the
zero lower bound. This paper has left aside the role of policy and monetary regimes. On these aspects during Great
Depression, see e.g. Eichengreen (1992), and Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
39nature, it is a dynamic monetary model, specifying how agents adjust their asset holdings in response
to losses, and how this determines deﬂation and asset prices in general equilibrium.
The main ﬁnding was that several channels of debt-deﬂation are active, but none is destabilising,
even when large shocks, high indebtedness, and wide-spread default are considered. Stability is
largely due to the optimal policy of user cost spending, and the presence of agents without any prior
debt or losses. Their ability and willingness to take on more debt and purchase assets stabilises the
asset market which we found to be central to the debt-deﬂation process. By contrast, when margin
constraints or a credit crunch prevents agents from following this course, debt-deﬂation can become
unstable.
Debt-deﬂation does not develop when agents forego distress selling and reﬁnance their assets instead,
as Minsky conjectured. But reﬁnancing requires accommodation, an expansion of the banking system.
This is certainly feasible in our frictionless inside money model, but may no longer be so when reserve
or capital requirements bind, or when the economy is subject asymmetric information and frictions.
In the absence of such complications, the idea that monetary contraction directly produces deﬂation
receives little support. It is the price of assets, rather than the quantity of money, that drives
deﬂation.
These results are subject to the limitations of our stylised model. While our frictionless, ﬂexible
price speciﬁcation serves to highlight distributional eﬀects, it neglects output eﬀects that accompany
actual episodes of debt-deﬂation. Similarly, while the absence of uncertainty puts into sharp relief
key features of the mechanism, it neglects precautionary behaviour that could work in a destabilising
direction. Extensions along these lines would bring the theory closer to Fisher and Minsky’s original
intent and make it more relevant for today. In developing such extensions it is worth retaining the
model’s basic premise that stability hinges on agents’ reactions to losses.
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43Appendix A: Changes in spending
A1. Optimal user cost spending
Each generation of ﬁrms is aﬀected diﬀerently by the shock in t. In computing agents’ changes in
spending, we take their period constraints (3) as the starting point, where all variables, including
debt, are at their steady state values until t. Denote by δt = (q − qt)/q the percentage decline in
the asset price, and by (1−pt) deﬂation relative to the steady state price level p = 1 prevailing until
t.
Young ﬁrms can factor in new goods and asset prices before taking on debt. Hence they behave as
in perfect foresight. Optimal spending on goods and assets is given by (5) and (6), forwarded once.
As there will be a competitive labor market at date t, we use (11), forwarded once, to write proﬁts
Πt+2 in terms of steady state proﬁts as Πt+2 = Πpt+2. Thus
pt+2ct+2 = (1 − θ)Πpt+2 (42)
Rut+1h0




This is simply pt+2 times steady state spending, pc and Ruh. Subsequent generations’ spending is
of the same form, with subscripts forwarded accordingly.
Old ﬁrms only have their debt repayment and ﬁnal consumption left to do. Hence, any unexpected
losses show up as a wealth eﬀect on consumption spending. Coming out of steady state, their budget
constraint (3) reads
ptct + R2qh + w = pty + qth.
Debt is predetermined, whereas the ability to repay, on the right, is not. They had borrowed qh in
t−2, expecting to sell assets and goods at continued steady state prices q and p = 1, but prices are
now qt and pt, respectively. The combined loss relative to steady state equals
Ω ≡ qhδt + (1 − pt)y,
the percentage decline in the value of asset holdings, plus the loss of sales revenue to deﬂation.
(Deviations can be negative.) Limited liability requires that ﬁnal consumption be non-negative;
should the loss Ω exceed planned consumption spending pc = (1 − θ)Π, ﬁrms would pass on the
diﬀerence in the form of non-performing loans,85
λ ≡ max{0,Ω − (1 − θ)Π}. (44)
The ﬁrms’ eﬀective loss is thus limited to Ω − λ. With only consumption left to do, consumption
spending is reduced by this amount (relative to steady state),
ptct = pc − (Ω − λ) ≥ 0. (45)
Mid-age ﬁrms already incurred debt, yet they can still alter both their asset position and ﬁnal
consumption. The loss (19) has been discussed in the text. The largest loss mid-age ﬁrms can absorb
is Π0 ≡ (1 − θ)Π/R+uh, the amount they would free up by spending nothing on consumption and on






85Non-performing loans can equivalently be written as total debt minus repayment ability, R
2qh − (pty + qth).
Expanding by Rqh−Rqh+qh−qh+py−py to bring up user costs, expressing t dated terms as deviations from these
steady state values, and replacing Π − R(1 + R)uh = (1 − θ)Π yields (44).
44Mid-age ﬁrms therefore see their budget set tighten by [Ω0 − λ0]. This is consistent with combining
the equations in (18) to obtain
pt+1ct+1 + R2uh + Ruth0
t = pt+1y − w − R(ρ + qhδt),






[Π0 − Ω0]R if λ0 = 0
0 if λ0 > 0.
(47)
This expression equates remaining spending to the remaining budget which, relative to steady state,
is reduced by the loss Ω0. The three reactions (section 3.2) diﬀer in the way they distribute the loss
Ω0 between reduced spending on consumption and assets. Reoptimisation determines how best to
respond to the loss by adjusting {h0
t,ct+1} over the remaining horizon,
max V 0 = (1 − θ0)lnct+1 + θ0 lnh0
t s.t. (47). (48)
The modiﬁed share θ0 < θ reﬂects the fact that the remaining horizon for holding assets is now
shorter.86 Proceeding as before (page 12), one ﬁnds revised spending pt+1ct+1 and Ruth0
t equal to
the ﬁxed proportions (1 − θ0) and θ0 of the remaining budget. In steady state, the same proportions
would have resulted in steady state spending, pc and Ruh. Therefore, spending is revised downward
in proportion to the loss,
uth0
t = uh − θ0 
Ω0 − λ0
(49)





Note that the revision is nil if the loss Ω0 is zero. At the other extreme, the demands h0
t and ct+1
smoothly merge to zero as the ﬁrm approaches insolvency: the revision reaches the full value of
steady state spending, ct+1 = h0
t = 0 when Ω0 ≥ Π0.87 Reoptimisation implies the continuation of
user cost spending (21).
The Banking system neither holds real assets nor sells goods. It is nonetheless exposed to market
prices through the possible default of its borrowers. If any generation of ﬁrms defaults, non-performing
loans become positive,
λ+ ≡ λ + λ0 ≥ 0.
As bank proﬁts and capital are zero, recognizing loan losses amounts to reducing the value of deposits
in the same measure.
Households face losses if deposits are reduced by λ+, and may earn lower future wages in (8). On













In steady state, this constraint would be
P∞
i=0 (s − w)/Ri = RD. Taking the diﬀerence yields (26)
in the text and shows by how much households must revise downward future spending when deposits
and future wages fall relative to steady state.
86We normalized the Cobb-Douglas exponents relating to ct+1 and h
0




1 − θ + θβ/(1 + β)
=
θ
1 + (1 − θ)R
.
87The parameters satisfy θ
0Π
0 = θΠ/[R(1 + R)] = uh, and (1 − θ
0)RΠ
0 = (1 − θ)Π = pc.
45A2. Reﬁnancing
The question of reﬁnancing only concerns mid-age ﬁrms; generations t − 2 and t need not be
considered. Suppose there is a ﬁxed cost F of adjusting asset holdings. (Such costs are plausible
especially in the context of real estate.) Reoptimisation now involves comparing utility between (1)
the optimal consumption and asset holding given F; and (2) residual consumption after reﬁnancing
assets. Part (1) leads to the same optimal spending as in (49), with the ﬁxed cost F added to the
loss Ω0.
Part (2) is found using h0
t = h in (47),
pt+1ct+1 + Ruth = (1 − θ)Π + Ruh − RΩ0
i.e. pt+1ct+1 = pc + R(u − ut)h − RΩ0.
Since (u − ut)qh ≡ (δt − δt+1/R)qh, one obtains (23) in the text,
pt+1ct+1 = pc − [Rρ + qhδt+1 + (1 − pt+1)y].
Note that this expression must remain positive, otherwise reﬁnancing is not feasible (it is not aﬀord-
able, a fortiori, for defaulting ﬁrms, assuming ut > 0). The decision to reﬁnance then compares these
two allocations in terms of utility (48) at equilibrium prices. Reﬁnancing will be chosen if the ﬁxed
cost F is large enough to oﬀset the gain from optimally adjusting both assets and consumption.88
A3. Constant indebtedness
Mid-age ﬁrms. From (17) we know indebtedness in steady state remains constant and equal to
L = RB0/Π. Not allowing indebtedness to exceed this constant requires RB0
t ≤ LΠt+1. Since proﬁts
are now reduced to Π−RΩ0, constant indebtedness requires a reduction of debt to B0
t = B0 −LΩ0.
Using this along with B0 = RB in the second line of (18) yields (24). Of course, the value of distress
selling no longer increases when ρ + LΩ0 reaches qth, the value of asset holdings.
Solving (24) for h0








Substituting this expression into (47) delivers consumption spending (25).
Young ﬁrms. Their debt equals Bt = qtht, from (3) forwarded once. Their proﬁts are given
by continued labour market clearing (11), wt+2 = wpt+2 and Πt+2 = Πpt+2. Thus, keeping
indebtedness equal to (17) implies
Bt
Πt+2/R2 = L ⇒ qtht = qhpt+2.
Note that ﬁrms will not adjust their asset positions over their life-time: young ﬁrms’ indebtedness
remains constant when assets do. When no assets are sold, h0
t+1 = ht hence B0
t+1 = RBt from (3).
Since Bt satisﬁes the equation above, B0
t+1 also satisﬁes B0
t+1/(Πt+2/R) = L. Using the results
Bt = qhpt+2 and h0








88We do not pursue the issue of ﬁnding the optimal (S,s) policy for a given F, or ﬁnding the critical F for which
reﬁnancing is preferred in equilibrium. When discussing reﬁnancing in the text, we assume that F is large enough for
agents to opt for reﬁnancing
46Appendix B: Aggregation and equilibrium
B1. Aggregation
Agents’ market participation can be read oﬀ ﬁgure 2. Due to ﬂexible prices and the absence of
frictions, the supply side is unchanged with output y and assets 2h. In what follows, the terms λ
and λ0 only serve to keep spending non-negative in the event of default.
Labour market. Recall that wages are determined on a competitive labour market at the time of
hiring (footnote 26). Therefore, wt and wt+1 were determined before the shock in t occured, and
equal w = εy. From t + 2 onward the perfect foresight equilibrium (11) applies, following the exit
of all ﬁrms aﬀected by the shock. Thus spending deviates from that in steady state to the extent
future prices deviate from 1.
Goods market. As in (12), the value of aggregate demand consists of spending by households
and old ﬁrms. For date t, we use (45) to obtain pty = st + pc − [qhδt + (1 − pt)y − λ], or, since
py = s + pc,
(1 − pt)y = (s − st) + [qhδt + (1 − pt)y − λ]. (51)
The goods market of t + 1 similarly aggregates spending, using (50),
(1 − pt+1)y = (s − st+1) +
 
1 − θ0
ρ + qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R − λ0
R. (52)
By t + 2 the goods market reverts to the perfect foresight equilibrium, because all agents entering t
or later take into account new equilibrium prices. Using (42) in deviations,
(1 − pt+2)y = (s − st+2) + (1 − pt+2)pc. (53)
Successive goods market clearing conditions are connected by the Euler equation (9).
Asset market. Asset market equilibrium in t equates 2uth to the value of user cost spending by
young and mid-age ﬁrms in (43) and (49), respectively,
2uth = uhpt+2 + uh − θ0 
Ω0 − λ0
.
To bring out the asset price decline, we write in deviations (u − ut) ≡ q (δt − δt+1/R). When
unexpected losses reduce spending (the right-hand side is positive), the user cost must fall relative









ρ + qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R − λ0
+ uh(1 − pt+2). (54)
The asset market in t+1 features ﬁrms of generations t and t+1, none of whom suﬀered unexpected









(1 − pt+2) + (1 − pt+3)
i
.
Subsequent asset market conditions are of the same form.
47B2. Equilibrium
To simplify the equilibrium system, we work backwards.
Reversion to steady state. Due to the overlapping generations structure, the economy reverts to
a steady state in t + 2. Goods market clearing (53) simpliﬁes to st+i = spt+i from i = 2 onward.
Substituting into the Euler equation (9) implies that the price level remains constant, pt+i = pt+2,
for all i ≥ 2. Call the new steady state price level p0; then wages and proﬁts equal wt+i = wp0 and
Πt+i = Πp0, for all i ≥ 2, and spending in (42) remains constant, hence all other variables, too. We
show below that ρ = 0 leads to the same real allocation as in the original steady state. Hence we
require that p0 also be equal to the original p = 1; this normalisation remains valid for ρ > 0, in that
the equilibrium conditions are consistent with households’ intertemporal budget constraint (26).
This allows to simplify the Euler equations and households’ budget constraint. One can invert the
Euler equation (9) to obtain pt = pt+1 [st+1/st]
γ/(1−γ), and pt+1 = p0 [sp0/st+1]
γ/(1−γ). With p0 = 1





γ−1 , for i = 0,1. (55)
Households’ intertemporal budget constraint also simpliﬁes. Since pt+i = 1, st+i = s, wt+i = w, for
all i ≥ 2, (26) becomes
(s − st) + (s − st+1)/R = λ+ − ρ. (56)
This relation shows that the deposits carried into the new steady state are indeed equal to what they
were in the old steady state, Dt+1 = D.90
Equilibrium system. Combining (51), (52), and (54) yields
GMt : (1 − pt)y = (s − st) + [qhδt + (1 − pt)y − λ]
GMt+1 : (1 − pt+1)y = (s − st+1) + (1 − θ0)

ρ + qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R − λ0
R.




qhδt + (1 − pt+1)y/R + ρ − λ0
,
together with (55), wt+i = w for i ≥ 0, δt+i = (1 − p0) = 0 for i ≥ 1, and pt+i = p0 = 1 for i ≥ 2.
This system is consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint: substituting GMt and GMt+1
into (56) makes it hold identically. Hence we use (56) to replace (52), and arrive at
GMt : st = s + qhδt − λ
GMt+1 : st+1 = s − R[qhδt − ρ + λ0]
AMt : δt = θ
0
(2−θ0)qh [ρ + (1 − pt+1)y/R − λ0].
(57)
Existence and uniqueness. Consider (57) when ρ = 0. Clearly, setting all deviations to zero
solves this system; the continued steady state is a solution. To show uniqueness requires expanding
the terms in non-performing loans. The system (57), as the deﬁnition of λ+, comprises the four
possibilities that no-one, old ﬁrms, mid-aged ﬁrms, or both types default. Yet only two cases need
to be considered (the possible default of old ﬁrms does not change the nature of the system).
Case 1. If mid-age ﬁrms do not default (λ0 = 0). Combining AMt in GMt+1, and substituting into
89This shows that p
0 = 1 is equivalent to the assumption that the Euler equation (9) holds between t − 1 and t in
spite of the shock: pt−1 = pt [st/s]
γ/(1−γ) also yields (55), since pt−1 = 1.
90Using (8), Dt+1 = RDt +w−st+1. Inserting Dt = RD−λ
+ +ρ+w−st, and recalling that s−w = (R − 1)D,
one obtains Dt+1 = D − R
￿
λ
+ − ρ − (st − s)
￿
− (st+1 − s) = D by virtue of (56).
48(55) yields the implicit equation





(2−θ0)s. The right-hand side has the slope Θp
1/γ
t+1γ/(γ − 1) and is convex. Therefore,
the only solution is pt+1 = 1.91 With pt+1 = 1, the steady state continues: δt = 0, pt = 1, hence
old ﬁrms do not fail either (λ = 0).
Case 2. If mid-age ﬁrms do default (λ0 > 0). In this case, mid-age ﬁrms spend nothing, h0
t =
ct+1 = 0. As shown in (33), this leads to pt+1 = εγ ≡ p and δt = (R − 1)/(2R) ≡ δ.92 Hence,
assuming λ0 > 0 returns a solution that results in st+1 = py and st = s+qhδ (or st = py should old
ﬁrms also default). But if γ < 1, this solution is not an equilibrium when ρ = 0, because deﬂation  
1 − p

is not suﬃcient to make mid-age ﬁrms default, which contradicts the assumption λ0 > 0.93
Equivalently, this solution violates the budget constraint (56).94 By contrast, if γ > 1, then the
above solution can be an equilibrium for those combinations of {ε,γ,θ} that imply mid-age ﬁrms
default. It is easy to check that, given γ > 1 and λ0 > 0, the budget constraint (56) holds identically
at prices p and δ.
In conclusion, at ρ = 0, the unique equilibrium is the continued steady state, provided γ < 1; when
γ > 1, a default equilibrium with reduced prices exists for some parameter combinations.
Explicit solutions. Write the solution (32) as pt+1 = [1 − a + apt+1 + bρ], where a ≡ m/ε and











Explicit solutions can be readily obtained for quadratic cases. For γ = 1/2 we solve p−1
t+1 =
[1 − a + apt+1 + bρ], and for γ = 2, pt+1 = [1 − a + apt+1 + bρ]
2. The quadratic solutions can
be written as95




(1 + a + bρ)
2 − 4abρ − (1 + a + bρ)











In both cases pt+1(0) = 1, pt+1(ρ) < 1, and p0
t+1 (ρ) < 0.
91If γ < 1, the slope is negative and cuts the 45
0 line at 1. If γ > 1, the slope is positive cuts the 45
0 line at 1 and
possibly at some smaller value too. But it can cut twice only if the right-hand side, evaluated at pt+1 = 0, exceeds
zero (and only for some γ > 1). This is contradicted by the fact that Θ < 1. The latter holds because, from the
relations s = εy in (12), and θ
0 ≡ θ[1 + (1 − θ)R]
−1. (Θ
0(ε) < 0, Θ
0(θ) > 0, thus Θ reaches its maximum at ε = 0
and θ
0 = θ = 1.)
92The latter comes from using Ω
0 − λ
0 = Π







93To see this, losses Ω





y/R + qhδ > (pc/R + uh).
This is equivalent to s − py > Rqhδ, ie. (ε − ε
γ)y >
θΠ
2(1+R). This cannot hold when γ < 1, since the left-hand side
would be negative. It may hold if γ > 1, depending on parameters ε,γ and θ.
94The constraint requires (s − st) + (s − st+1)/R > 0 when ρ = 0. Observe that γ < 1 results in ε
γ > ε, hence
st+1 and st both exceed s, see (12).
95The solution for γ = 2 is tenuous - it allows a sunspot solution (the negative root) and a real solution may fail to
exist for large ρ.
49B3. Fixed indebtedness in general equilibrium
The behaviour of ﬁrms observing constant indebtedness was derived in section 3.2(3) and appendix
A3. We now look at the equilibrium implications. In t, asset market equilibrium is given in (38),
goods market equilibrium (29) remains unchanged, and the failure of old ﬁrms implies pt =p. In
t + 1, goods market equilibrium can be derived from (25),






and the failure of mid-age ﬁrms would similarly imply pt+1 =p.
From here onwards, the equilibrium equations become invariant over time, since all future generations
have asset and goods demands analogous to young ﬁrms of generation t. All asset markets T ≥ t+1
can therefore be found by substituting into hT + h0
T = 2h the results of appendix A3, namely
qThT = qhpT+2 and h0









∀T ≥ t + 2. (59)
This asset price guarantees that each generation keeps constant indebtedness equal to (17), buying
the assets of old ﬁrms when young, and passing on this quantity of assets to young ﬁrms when old
(see ﬁgure 2).
Similarly, all goods markets T ≥ t + 2 can be found by substituting into pt+2y = st+2 + pt+2ct+2
the results of appendix A3, to obtain
sT = pT




















∀T ≥ t + 2. (60)
The equilibrium sequence of asset and goods prices, suggests a periodicity of 2. If any two even-dated
price levels are equal, pT+2 = pT with T arbitrarily large, it follows from (59) that even-dated asset
prices are equal, which in turn implies that even-dated price levels in (60) equal pT = 1. The same
argument can be made for odd-dated prices. One obtains pT = 1 ∀T > t + 1, and
qT = qt ∀ even T > t
qT = qt+1 ∀ odd T > t.
While the price level reverts to 1, the asset price enters a periodic orbit around q.97 Constant
indebtedness has asset prices cycle indeﬁnitely around their steady state value. This reﬂects a cycle
in asset holding, as each generation spends exactly qh. Following the distress selling by mid-age
agents, young agents in t absorb more assets than in steady state, and hold them until t+2. Hence,
96The simpliﬁcation follows from using the steady state relations y = w+Π, s−w = (R − 1)D, and D = (1 + R)qh.





whose second iterate returns the ﬁxed point, qT+2 = G(qT+1) = G(G(qT)) = qT.
50the new generation in t + 1 must, in equilibrium, purchase less assets than in steady state, holding
these until t + 3, and so on.
B4. Wage rigidity, employment, and output
This appendix shows that wage rigidity reduces employment and output to the extent that the price
level remains low. Recall that ﬁrms hire at t to produce output sold in t + 2 (page 11). Due to
the delay in production, the wage set in t and paid out in t + 2, wt+2, corresponds to pt+2. Firms’
ﬁrst-order condition was given in (1) as y0(nd
t) = wt+2/pt+2. Using a speciﬁc production function
that satisﬁes y(1) = y, for example y(n) = ynε, the condition becomes
εpt+2ynε−1
t = wt+2. (61)
In assuming wage ﬂexibility, we have so far imposed the market clearing condition nd
t = 1 to determine
the competitive wage. Now, introducing wage rigidity, we impose a ﬁxed wage and determine
equilibrium unemployment. Assuming that wages do not immediately adjust to the shock, the wage
set at t remains unchanged from the previous period, wt+2 = w = εy. From (61) one easily obtains
the equilibrium values in the two regimes:
Equilibrium Value Wage Flexibility Wage Rigidity
Wage wt+2 = εpt+2y εy
Unemployment 1 − nt = 0 1 − p
1/(1−ε)
t+2
Output y(nt) = y yp
ε/(1−ε)
t+2
Proﬁts Πt+2 = (1 − ε)pt+2y (1 − ε)p
1/(1−ε)
t+2 y.
To the extent that pt+2 < 1, wage rigidity leads to higher wages, positive unemployment, reduced
output, and lower proﬁts. Lower proﬁts in turn imply reduced spending on goods and assets by
ﬁrms. The mass product of wages is also reduced, ntw = εp
1/(1−ε)
t+2 y < εy. This all suggests that
the equilibrium price level under wage rigidity should indeed be lower than under wage ﬂexibility.
However, reduced aggregate spending must be set against reduced aggregate output. Goods market
equilibrium again requires pt+2y (nt) = st+2 +(1 − θ)Πt+2. Using the equilibrium values associated
with wage rigidity, one obtains st+2 = εpt+2y, as was the case in (12). Since nothing invalidates the
Euler equation in (27), it follows that pt+2 = 1, as was the case under wage ﬂexibility (appendix B2).
In this example, aggregate supply falls by as much as aggregate spending, leaving the price level
unchanged.
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